Voluntary compliance and implied cost of equity capital : evidence from Canadian share repurchase programs by Leung, Joanne
 
VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE AND IMPLIED COST OF EQUITY CAPITAL: 
EVIDENCE FROM CANADIAN SHARE REPURCHASE PROGRAMS 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted to the College of 
Graduate Studies and Research 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
For the Degree of Master of Science in Finance 
In the Department of Finance and Management Science 
Edwards School of Business 









Keywords: share repurchases, implied cost of capital, voluntary compliance 
 
© Copyright Joanne Leung, September 2008. All rights reserved.
  i
PERMISSION TO USE 
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for a Postgraduate degree from 
the University of Saskatchewan, I agree that the Libraries of this University may make it freely 
available for inspection.  I further agree that permission for copying of this thesis in any manner, 
in whole or in part, for scholarly purposes may be granted by the professor or professors who 
supervised my thesis work or, in their absence, by the Head of the Department or the Dean of the 
College in which my thesis work was done.  It is understood that any copying or publication or 
use of this thesis or parts thereof for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written 
permission.  It is also understood that due recognition shall be given to me and to the University 
of Saskatchewan in any scholarly use which may be made of any material in my thesis. 
 
 Requests for permission to copy or to make other use of material in this thesis in whole or 
part should be addressed to: 
 
 
 Head of the Department of Finance and Management Science 
 Edwards School of Business 
 University of Saskatchewan 
 25 Campus Drive 









Securities legislation in Canada and around the world does not mandate firms to fulfill 
announced share repurchase programs. As such, a firm’s repurchase program completion rate can 
be interpreted as a measure of the firm’s voluntary compliance, which communicates to investors 
the degree to which the firm is responsible, reliable and makes good faith efforts to fulfill its 
announced programs.  We therefore expect that the voluntary compliance may reduce the 
riskiness of a firm and thus its cost of capital.  In a sample of Canadian repurchase programs 
announced between 1995 and 2004, surprisingly, we find little evidence to suggest that a 
significant relationship exists between the firm’s repurchase program completion rate and the 




I thank my thesis supervisors Dr. Dev Mishra and Dr. Marie Racine for their patience and 
invaluable guidance and members of my committee, Dr. Abdullah Mamun and Dr. Suresh 
Kalagnanam, for their helpful suggestions. I thank Luke Schmidt for providing share repurchase 
data. I am also grateful to my family and friends for their encouragement and support. 
 iv 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
page 
 
PERMISSION TO USE................................................................................................................... i 
ABSTRACT.................................................................................................................................... ii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................................. iii 
LIST OF TABLES......................................................................................................................... vi 
LIST OF FIGURES ...................................................................................................................... vii 
CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................1 
CHAPTER 2  LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................................4 
2.1 An Overview of Open-Market Repurchases......................................................................... 4 
2.1.1   Institutional Framework .............................................................................................6 
2.1.2   Repurchase Motives ...................................................................................................7 
2.2  Repurchase Completion Rates as a Form of Voluntary Compliance ................................ 17 
2.3  Voluntary Compliance as a Means of Disclosure.............................................................. 19 
2.4  Information Disclosure and the Cost of Equity Capital..................................................... 20 
2.5  The Implied Cost of Equity Estimation Approach ............................................................ 24 
CHAPTER 3  DATA DESCRIPTION AND METHODOLOGY ................................................27 
3.1  Sample Construction.......................................................................................................... 27 
3.2  Implied Cost of Equity Capital Estimation........................................................................ 33 
3.2.1   The Claus and Thomas (2001) Approach ................................................................35 
3.2.2   The Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001) Approach..........................................36 
3.2.3   The Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) Approach................................................38 
3.2.4   The Easton (2004) Approach ...................................................................................39 
3.3  Explanatory Variables used in Regression Analysis ......................................................... 43 
CHAPTER 4  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE......................................................................................51 
4.1  Effect of Voluntary Compliance and the Cost of Equity................................................... 52 
4.2  Robustness Checks............................................................................................................. 56 
4.3  Discussion .......................................................................................................................... 64 
CHAPTER 5  CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................68 
 v 
5.1  Limitations ......................................................................................................................... 69 
5.2  Contributions...................................................................................................................... 71 
5.3  Suggestions for Future Research ....................................................................................... 71 
LIST OF REFERENCES...............................................................................................................73 




LIST OF TABLES 
Table page 
 
Table 3.1  Summary of Sample Construction................................................................................32 
Table 3.2  Summary of Similarities and Differences among the Four Estimation Models ...........41 
Table 3.3  Summary Statistics of RP Estimates.............................................................................42 
Table 3.4  Summary of Regression Variables ...............................................................................48 
Table 3.5  Definitions of Regression Variables .............................................................................50 
Table 4.1  Effect of Voluntary Compliance on the Implied Cost of Equity ..................................53 
Table 4.2  Effect of Voluntary Compliance on Individual Model RP ...........................................57 
Table 4.3  Robustness Check for Size Proxy.................................................................................60 
Table 4.4  Robustness Check for Possible Collinearity Problems with Leverage.........................61 
Table 4.5  Effect of Voluntary Compliance on the Implied Cost of Equity Capital......................63 
 
  vii  
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure page 
 





This study examines the role of voluntary compliance, as measured by the firm’s repurchase 
program completion rate, in affecting the firm’s cost of equity capital. Canadian securities 
legislation limits firms announcing open-market share repurchase programs to a 12-month period 
within which to make their repurchases. As noted by Stephens and Weisbach (1998) and Grullon 
and Ikenberry (2000), open-market share repurchase programs are flexible particularly with 
respect to the degree of program completion. Firms may choose to purchase some, all or none of 
its targeted shares. Banyi, Dyl and Kahle (2005) state that even if firms fail to fulfill their 
announced actions, they face no legal penalty. Because of this flexibility, any shares repurchased 
reflect a voluntary decision by the firm to comply with their announcement to repurchase.  This 
voluntary compliance can be considered as being equivalent to a voluntary disclosure, discussed 
in extant literature as being negatively associated with the cost of capital [Welker (1995); Healy, 
Hutton and Palepu (1999); Bloomfield and Wilks (2000)].   
Our study is motivated by research which examines market perceptions of the firm’s 
repurchase activity.  Moore (2005) discusses the possibility that the degree of fulfillment of a 
firm’s repurchase program in the past is a credibility indicator of subsequent repurchase 
fulfillment.  Mishra, Racine and Schmidt (2007) find support for a positive association between a 
firm’s completion credibility and the market reaction to subsequent repurchase announcements.  
These studies suggest that investors take into consideration a firm’s repurchase activity history, 
particularly its degree of fulfillment, when forming perceptions of the firm, affecting their 
reactions to subsequent corporate actions.   
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We contribute to the literature by directly testing whether the cost of capital is affected by the 
firm’s share repurchase completion rate.  Our measure of cost of capital allows us to directly test 
the perceived impact of share repurchases in the firm’s cost of capital (denominator term of the 
discounted cash flow equation), while simultaneously controlling for its impact in expected cash 
flows (numerator term). Our methodology allows us to examine whether the cost of equity is a 
significant channel through which the share repurchase completion rate affects post-completion 
firm value. In addition, we shed light on whether the market perceives the share repurchase 
completion rate as voluntary compliance affecting the firm’s perceived risk. To our knowledge, 
this is the first study to do so.  Further, researchers have recently focused on the repurchase 
completion rate in efforts to understand its information content [e.g., Stephens and Weisbach 
(1998); Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (2000); Chan, Ikenberry, Lee and Wang (2005)].  
We add to these studies by examining the effect of the repurchase completion rate (as a measure 
of the firm’s voluntary repurchase program compliance) on investor perceptions about the 
riskiness of firms’ announcement and disclosure and its apparent impact on cost of equity 
capital. 
In order to empirically test the relationship between the firm’s voluntary repurchase 
compliance and the cost of equity, we estimate the firm’s implied cost of equity capital along the 
lines of Hail and Leuz (2006) and Dhaliwal, Heitzman and Li (2006).  The implied cost of 
capital estimation approach has been recently suggested by researchers [Claus and Thomas 
(2001); Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001); Gode and Mohanram (2003)] as an alternative 
to the CAPM and various models that necessitate the use of realized returns as a proxy for 
expected returns because cost of equity estimates from these types of models have been found to 
be imprecise [e.g. see Fama and French (1997)].  We run a cross-sectional regression of RP 
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(implied cost of equity in excess of the risk free rate) on the firm’s repurchase program 
completion rate.  Our results indicate little evidence of a relationship between the firm’s 
repurchase program completion rate and the cost of equity.  Section 4.3 includes several 




This chapter contains a review of the relevant literature.  Section 1 provides an overview of 
share repurchases. Section 2 details the rationale for repurchase program completion rates as a 
form of voluntary compliance. Section 3 addresses the information disclosure aspect of voluntary 
compliance. Section 4 discusses the information disclosure literature as it relates to the cost of 
equity. Section 5 discusses the motivation behind the use of the implied cost of equity estimation 
approach as an alternative to more traditional approaches. 
 
2.1 An Overview of Open-Market Repurchases 
There has been a substantial increase in open market share repurchases in recent years. 
Mauboussin (2006) reports that the value of repurchases as a percentage of total payout has 
increased from 5% in 1977 to 53% in 2004. Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000) 
document a 650% increase in the number of open market share repurchase program 
announcements made by U.S. industrial firms between 1985 and 1996. They also document a 
750% increase in the value of these announced programs. Grullon and Michaely (2002a) state 
that expenditures on repurchase programs as a percentage of total earnings increased from 4.8% 
in 1980 to 41.8% in 2000.  Furthermore, as an indication of the recent prevalence of repurchase 
programs, Grullon and Ikenberry (2000) report that as of January 2000, 70% of firms included in 
the S&P500 initiated open-market repurchase programs within the past five years.  Grullon and 
Michaely (2002a) suggest that the increase in open market share repurchases is attributable to the 
use of repurchases as an alternative to dividends as a method of payout.  
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Firms repurchase shares to signal positive earnings prospects and address undervaluation 
[Comment and Jarrell (1991); Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995); Stephens and 
Weisbach (1998); and Baker, Powell and Veit (2003)], mitigate agency problems associated with 
free cash flow [Grullon and Michaely (2002b)], serve as a substitute for dividend increases 
[Grullon and Michaely (2002a)], counter dilutive effects of employee stock options [Bens, 
Nagar, Skinner and Wong (2003)], and deter takeovers [Billett and Xue (2006)].  While the 
open-market share repurchase approach is not the only repurchase approach available to 
companies in Canada and the U.S., it is undoubtedly the most prevalent method used [Grullon 
and Ikenberry (2000) and Mauboussin (2006)].  Preference for the open-market repurchase 
method is frequently attributed to the flexibility that open-market share repurchases afford to 
firms initiating these programs, particularly in terms of commitment.  If firms fail to fully 
complete their announced programs, no legal disciplinary action is taken against them [Banyi, 
Dyl and Kahle (2005)].  This is the case in both Canada and the U.S.  Previous literature, 
however, suggests that repurchase programs in the two countries differ in terms of regulation.  
Disclosure requirements for repurchase programs in Canada appear to be more stringent 
compared to those in the U.S.  Canadian repurchasing firms must disclose their repurchase 
activity to the Toronto Stock Exchange each month and repurchase programs are subject to a 12 
month time frame for completion.1  Firms in the U.S. previously were not obligated to disclose, 
register or otherwise report any information to the stock market or exchange regarding their 
repurchase activities aside from the initial program announcement [Grullon and Ikenberry 
                                                 
1 According to Grullon and Ikenberry (2000, p. 45), "In Canada, disclosure of actual repurchase 
activity is far more extensive and meaningful. There the exchanges gather and publish each 
month the previous month's trading activity for all authorized programs. Thus, it is easy to find 
the exact level of repurchase activity at any point in time, the number of shares still authorized 
for repurchase, and the program's termination date.” 
 
  6
(2000)].  Disclosure requirements in the U.S. have since been modified.  Amendments made by 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in November 2003 (effective December 2003) 
now require firms to disclose the number of shares repurchased and the average repurchase price 
each quarter.2 Despite the recently increased disclosure requirements, repurchasing firms in the 
U.S. are still not required to complete their programs under any specific time limits.3 Though 
firms in both countries are now required to disclose their repurchase activity, they face no 
penalties if they choose not to complete their programs. The Toronto Stock Exchange’s rules 
governing open market share repurchases in Canada clearly stipulate that repurchasing firms 
must report their repurchase activity each month.4 So while the disclosure of repurchases is 
mandatory, the degree of compliance (fulfillment) with their announced programs is voluntary. 
2.1.1   Institutional Framework 
In Canada, open market share repurchases for firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange 
(TSX) are called “normal course issuer bids.” In order to repurchase its shares, a firm must file a 
notice with the TSX declaring its intention to repurchase shares and also specify the number of 
shares that the firm’s board of directors has decided to repurchase. The normal course issuer bid 
(or repurchase program) is allowed a one year period for repurchases to be made. Prior to TSX 
                                                 
2 The SEC amended Regulations S-K and S-B, and Forms 10Q, 10QSB, 10-K, 10-KSB, 20-F, 
and N-CSR to include periodic disclosure of share repurchases. 
 
3 Flexibility regarding the length of time a U.S. firm chooses to engage in its repurchase program 
is implied in section VI Disclosure of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s release 
pertaining to ‘Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and Others’ (refer to 
references), which reads “The final rules also require footnote disclosure of the principal terms 
of publicly announced repurchase plans or programs, including: […] the expiration date (if any) 
of the plans or programs […].” 
 
4 See TSX Company Manual, Part VI Changes in Capital Structure of Listed Issuers, L. Normal 
Course Issuer Bids, Section 629 Special Rules Applicable to Normal Course Issuer Bids, section 




acceptance of the notice, the firm must issue a press release detailing the number of shares 
sought, the reason for repurchase and specifics for any repurchases made in the previous 12 
months. The firm must outline its repurchase program in any upcoming documents (e.g. 
quarterly report) sent out to its security holders. Within the last 10 days of each month, the firm 
must report the number of shares it has repurchased in that month and the average repurchase 
price to the TSX. While Canadian firms are subject to a 12-month period for completion, firms 
are at liberty to complete their repurchases in any one month or spread over the 12 months.  The 
Toronto Stock Exchange’s rules governing open-market repurchases do not stipulate a 
repurchase schedule for the firm.5 
2.1.2   Repurchase Motives 
Researchers have suggested a variety of reasons why firms choose to repurchase their shares. 
These motives include: (i) signaling and addressing undervaluation, (ii) addressing agency 
problems, (iii) achieving optimal capital structure, (iv) serving as a substitute for dividends, (v) 
managing earnings per share, (vi) misaligned interests, and (vii) discouraging takeovers. Each of 
these will be discussed below. 
Signaling and undervaluation. Underlying the signaling and undervaluation hypothesis is 
the concept of information asymmetry between firm insiders (managers) and the investing public 
(outsiders).  Contemporary interpretations of informational asymmetry in financial markets have 
largely been based on Akerlof's (1970) “lemons” principle, which explores quality and 
uncertainty interactions in a market context. Insiders are expected to be more knowledgeable 
about their firm’s workings and prospects than the general public which brings about the need 
                                                 
5 For the Toronto Stock Exchange’s rules governing open-market share repurchases, refer to 
TSX Company Manual, Part VI Changes in Capital Structure of Listed Issuers, L. Normal 




for insiders to effectively communicate their quality to the market in some way. As Grullon and 
Ikenberry (2000) describe, managers may seek to communicate new information, specifically 
their optimism for firm prospects (for instance, imminent increases in firm cash flow and 
earnings) through repurchases. This positive outlook may not be shared by the market. Therefore 
the discrepancy between the current price and the intrinsic value arises from the firm’s inability, 
without repurchasing, to otherwise credibly inform investors of its prospects. Alternatively, 
managers may be at odds with the way that the market is valuing the firm’s current performance, 
and repurchases are meant to convey their disagreement.   
Incentives obviously exist for managers to misrepresent or window-dress the firm’s earnings 
prospects. As such, the investing public may be skeptical because they cannot discern an 
undervalued firm from an overvalued firm. Under these circumstances, “actions speak louder 
than words,” a phrase aptly applied by Leland and Pyle (1977) to illustrate that if managers are 
willing to undertake certain actions, they can signal to the market the firm’s true quality and the 
market will value the firm to reflect the information content of the signal. Grullon and Ikenberry 
(2000) rationalize that managers can convincingly signal their optimistic earnings prospects by 
participating in stock repurchases because they restrict the flexibility of managers.  The signal is 
credible because managers are prepared to engage in immediate cash payouts due to their belief 
that the anticipated rise in earnings will cover upcoming capital requirements. The mimicking of 
such strategy by lower quality firms is deterred because they face more chance of loss than 
superior quality firms; in other words, firms that expect a drop in earnings are less willing to 
repurchase shares considering the substantial outflow of capital would make them unable to 
invest in profitable projects and more importantly, might make them prone to risks of financial 
distress.   
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In their study, Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) gather announcements for open-
market share repurchases from the Wall Street Journal for a period beginning in 1980 and ending 
in 1990.  They note that although the majority of firms do not disclose the reason behind the 
repurchase, for the ones that do, the leading reason provided involves issues of undervaluation.6  
A survey conducted by Baker, Powell, and Veit (2003) also finds that undervaluation is the most 
commonly cited reason by managers participating in open-market repurchases from January 
1998 to September 1999.  Studies such as Comment and Jarrell (1991) and Stephens and 
Weisbach (1998) find that repurchase announcements are often preceded by negative firm 
performance, which has been interpreted as support for signaling and undervaluation theories.  
Dittmar (2000)7 finds some support that firms repurchase stock in order to address potential 
undervaluation; the variable used to measure undervaluation is significant in every year of her 
sample8. 
Although the undervaluation hypothesis has been supported by some studies, others find no 
empirical substantiation for it.  Grullon and Michaely (2002b) and Jagannathan and Stephens 
                                                 
6 In spite of this observation, Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) caution that reading 
these condensed press reports may not lead to a clear understanding of managers’ motives 
concerning repurchases. 
 
7 Dittmar (2000) uses U.S. cross-sectional data and a Tobit model estimated for each year in her 
sample which spans from 1977 to 1996 to simultaneously examine multiple motives for stock 
repurchasing. Although her sample is not confined to open market share repurchases and 
includes all manners of repurchasing, including fixed-price tender offer as well as dutch auction 
tender offer methods, open market share repurchases comprise the majority of her sample. 
 
8 Although undervaluation appears to be a strong motive in her study, Dittmar (2000) suggests 
that the results do not point to a precise and single determining motive behind share repurchases; 
it could be that firms repurchase depending on various factors in conjunction with one another. 
For example, a firm’s decisions to repurchase shares may be motivated by the desire to distribute 




(2003) find no evidence of improved operating performance subsequent to open-market 
repurchase announcements, despite the notion that managers use repurchases to signal positive 
earnings prospects. 
Agency Costs and Free Cash Flow. Some believe that firms repurchase stock in order to 
lessen agency problems related to free cash flow. Agency costs are an inevitable result of the 
separation of ownership and control, and they arise because there is a divergence in the interests 
of managers and shareholders [Jensen and Meckling (1976)].  Managers may fail to act in the 
best interest of shareholders because they have incentives to further firm growth at the sacrifice 
of value.  From a manager’s perspective, control of a larger firm means increased power and 
prestige, and with it, higher compensation [Jensen (1986)].  These potent managerial incentives 
may prevail even if they mean causing the firm to grow to a size beyond what is optimal. Jensen 
(1986) refers to free cash flow as the capital exceeding what is needed to finance positive net 
present value projects.  He explains that agency problems intensify when firms are faced with 
considerable free cash flow. To resolve this issue, managers must disgorge the excess cash 
instead of investing it in value-destroying projects. Jensen (1986) also suggests that as a way to 
cope with concerns relating to significant free cash flow, managers can increase dividend 
payments or buy back stock and in so doing, disburse cash that would otherwise be squandered 
on unprofitable projects. Not only do payouts diminish managerial power by shrinking resources 
under managerial control, but they also induce managers to behave in a way that conforms to 
shareholders’ interests as a result of stringent capital market monitoring when it comes time for 
the firm to seek new capital [Easterbrook (1984); Jensen (1986)]. Grullon and Michaely (2002b) 
find empirical support for the free cash flow and agency costs motive in their analysis of 
repurchases. 
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Optimal Leverage and Capital Structure. An optimal ratio of debt to equity is an important 
issue for firms because it corresponds to a situation where the firm is taking full advantage of 
any available tax shields and at the same time minimizing risks that may lead to financial 
distress. In achieving this optimal balance, firms reduce their cost of capital to a minimum and 
shareholder value increases [Mauboussin (2006)].  If a firm buys back its stock, equity decreases; 
so by repurchasing stock, firms can alter their capital structure by increasing their debt/equity 
ratios. The leverage ratio can be further drastically adjusted if the firm borrows in order to 
repurchase.   
Grullon and Ikenberry (2000) argue, however, that this leverage adjustment motive is not 
particularly convincing for open-market share repurchases because the number of shares sought 
in these programs generally represent only a small fraction of outstanding shares9 and also 
because programs tend to span several years before achieving completion. Therefore, it is 
unlikely that radical changes would be realized using this approach. They rationalize that on the 
other hand, firms can use repurchase programs to make small modifications to leverage ratios 
little by little over time to prevent the need to make large adjustment overhauls. The authors 
assert that routine firm activities such as participation in employee stock ownership plans or 
dividend reinvestment plans effectively act as small scale equity offerings which result in 
eventual diminishing of the leverage ratio. Open-market share repurchases thus help in 
maintaining firm leverage levels.   
                                                 
9 This is true for Canadian firms which are allowed to repurchase only a maximum of 5% of 
shares outstanding or 10% of the public float (whichever is greater) under their repurchase 
programs. For the Toronto Stock Exchange’s rules governing open-market share repurchases, 
refer to TSX Company Manual, Part VI Changes in Capital Structure of Listed Issuers, L. 




Researchers make a case that repurchases are therefore an appropriate measure to facilitate 
firms in either attaining their optimal leverage level or else in sustaining it.  Dittmar (2000) finds 
support for the leverage hypothesis in the later years of her sample and concludes that the 
leverage ratio has statistically significant but slight consequences on the repurchase decision. 
Dividend Substitution and the Rise of Repurchases. Prior to the early 80s, the favored 
method of payout was dividends.  However, the popularity of repurchases has grown over the 
last 20 years.10 Total expenditure on stock repurchases surpassed that of dividends for the first 
time in 1999.  Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) argue that the regulatory 
environment prior to 1982 discouraged many firms from repurchasing stock. They find that the 
amount of money spent on repurchase programs tripled only a year after SEC Rule 10b-18 was 
passed.   
Firms may prefer repurchases to dividends for two reasons: tax considerations and flexibility.  
Dividends are taxed as ordinary income at rates less favorable than the rates that capital gains are 
taxed. Grullon and Michaely (2002a) find that the substitution between dividends and share 
repurchases does not arise from companies cutting dividends and using the cash to repurchase 
stock, but rather from firms keeping dividend payout ratios constant while financing stock 
repurchases using the cash that would have gone toward dividend increases. The authors also 
observe that the market seems to respond favorably to the replacement of dividends with 
repurchases considering dividend cuts made by firms without repurchase plans experience 
significantly negative market reactions, but dividend cuts made by firms with repurchase plans 
experience insignificant market reactions.  However, Fama and French (2001) argue that the 
                                                 
10 Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) report that only 129 stock repurchase programs were 
initiated in 1985, roughly worth $16 billion, and by 1998 the number of repurchases rose to 
1,434 with a value over $200 billion.   
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decline of dividends is due in part by a surge in smaller companies that have low profitability 
and high growth opportunities. These kinds of firms generally pay no dividends.  Furthermore, 
they find that firms today tend to pay fewer dividends than they did 20 years ago, regardless of 
their characteristics. In spite of their findings, many studies suggest that a substitution of 
dividends by stock repurchases is occurring as a result of the relative benefits of stock 
repurchases.     
 Lie and Lie (1999) suggest that firms consider the tax circumstances of their shareholders 
in choosing repurchases over dividends, especially if their shares are held by institutional 
investors who might pressure the firm to provide them with that tax advantage. Also, repurchases 
provide more flexibility than dividends, presenting a particular advantage for firms that 
encounter temporary increases in cash flow. Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000) argue 
that dividend payments are a long-term commitment and firms are reluctant to increase dividends 
if they are unsure whether permanent operating cash flows can support the increase. Numerous 
empirical studies have shown that the market reacts negatively to dividend cuts. On the other 
hand, stock repurchases pose no such risks to the company as they do not imply that a repurchase 
program will be followed by subsequent repurchase programs. 
EPS Management and the Offsetting of EPS Dilution. Studies have shown that there exists 
a widespread belief among managers that the earnings per share (EPS) ratio has significant effect 
on their stock prices [see for example, Andrade (1999)].  This accounting ratio is used by many 
analysts to evaluate firm performance and firm value.  As a result, managers are reluctant to 
engage in investments that may have dilutive effects on EPS (of course there may be other 
reasons why managers hesitate to engage in dilutive transactions, for instance if their salary or 
bonus is in some way tied to EPS).   
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Some argue that repurchases are used to manage the EPS ratio because they have mechanical 
effects on the ratio’s numerator and denominator.  The numerator is affected because by 
repurchasing shares using its cash, the firm foregoes any return on cash or interest expense on 
cash borrowings.  The denominator is the average number of shares outstanding in the fiscal 
period and is affected because repurchases lower the number of shares outstanding.  These 
effects depend, however, on the timing of the repurchase in the firm’s fiscal period.  If the firm 
repurchases at the start of the fiscal period, then the repurchased shares are subtracted from the 
number of shares outstanding for the entire fiscal period.  On the other hand, if the firm 
repurchases at the end of the fiscal period, then it has little impact.  Similarly, current earnings 
will not be influenced much by foregone return if the firm decides to repurchase at fiscal end, 
though it will affect reporting in upcoming periods.  Also, it is important to note that share 
repurchases boost EPS only in circumstances where the firm’s earnings-to-price ratio exceeds the 
foregone return on cash. Hribar, Jenkins and Johnson (2006) suggest that firms may be using 
repurchases in order to meet analysts’ EPS forecasts.  They observe a surge in EPS boosting 
buybacks when these firms would have been just slightly short of analyst forecasts had they not 
engaged in these repurchases.     
 In addition to managing EPS, researchers also suggest that firms use repurchases to 
counter the effects of EPS dilution which result from the exercise of employee stock options. 
Mauboussin (2006) suggests that firms repurchase shares in order to maintain the number of 
shares outstanding at a steady level.  He states that of the S&P 500 companies that have been 
participating in buybacks since 2000, more than 30 percent have not observed a decline in their 
outstanding shares. Bens, Nagar, Skinner and Wong (2003) also find corroborating evidence that 
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the firm’s decision to repurchase is influenced by aims to offset dilutive effects of employee 
stock options.  
Management Incentives and Misaligned Interests. Some argue that the personal incentives 
of managers play an influential role in the firm’s repurchase activity. In particular, the decision 
to repurchase may be affected by the number of stock options that managers possess. This 
hypothesis is different from the optimal leverage hypothesis and the offsetting EPS dilution 
hypothesis.  In those theories, it is assumed that managers’ interests are aligned with those of 
shareholders and that the primary rationale behind engaging in repurchases is to increase firm 
value (by attaining or maintaining the optimal leverage or else maintaining certain equity-
valuation ratios). Under the current hypothesis, managers choose to initiate share repurchase 
programs mainly for the purposes of increasing the stock price for personal benefit.  Weisbenner 
(2000) finds that the amount of stock options held by executive employees affects payout policy 
in ways different from the amount held by other employees. Furthermore, it is argued that 
managers may refrain from engaging in activities that would bring down the stock price; 
activities such as the initiation of increases in dividend payments.  Plenty of empirical evidence 
is found in support of this hypothesis. Lambert, Lanen and Larcker (1989) find evidence that the 
dividend payout ratio decreases after a firm introduces management stock option policies.  Fenn 
and Liang (2001) produce similar findings and in addition they also document a significant 
positive relationship between stock repurchases and management stock options. Combined, these 
studies help explain the rise of stock repurchases and the decline of dividend payments.  Hall and 
Liebman (1998) observe that managerial stock option compensation has grown substantially 
since the 1980s.  When this finding is considered in conjunction with the findings of the 
aforementioned studies, the management incentive hypothesis seems to provide a plausible 
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explanation for the trend in increasing stock repurchases and decreasing dividends over the last 
20 years.  
Takeover Susceptibility and Deterrence. According to Bagwell (1991), share repurchases 
may be effective takeover deterrents because they increase the acquisition cost for the acquiring 
firm.  When the potential target seeks to repurchase shares from the open-market, the 
shareholders who are the most willing to part with their shares are the first ones to sell.  In doing 
so, the potential target eliminates the shareholders who would have sold their shares to the 
acquiring firm at the lowest prices.  The shareholders that remain are the ones that are more 
reluctant to sell, and hence will hold out for a higher price.  Therefore when the acquiring firm 
tries to purchase the target firm’s shares, it must pay a larger premium, which may deter firms 
looking to acquire.  Dittmar (2000) finds that compared to non-repurchasing firms, a higher 
proportion of repurchasing firms are under threat of takeover for certain sub-periods of her 
sample, which she interprets as suggesting that the susceptibility of being a takeover target may 
encourage firms to participate in repurchases.  Billett and Xue (2006) suggest that although it 
may be true that open-market repurchases deter takeovers as a result of discouraging unwelcome 
bids, it could also be that repurchases lessen agency costs as previous discussed, and hence cause 
the firm to be less appealing as a takeover target by lowering the gains that arise from 
disciplinary takeovers. Empirically, they find a strong association between repurchase activity 
and takeover threat. They attribute the weak results or lack of results of other studies to modeling 
problems.  In particular, they point out that other studies assume a sequence of events whereby 
repurchase activity occurs subsequent to takeover announcements. They argue, however, that if 
repurchases prevent takeovers at the outset, models used in other studies would be unable to 
detect the role of repurchases in fending off takeovers.  
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Repurchase Motives in the Context of the Current Study. The rationale of the current 
study relies on the information signal of the firm’s repurchase program completion; the firm’s 
voluntary repurchase compliance conveys information to the market about the integrity of the 
firm’s management in following through with its corporate announcements. The focus of this 
study is in investigating whether it is costly for the firm to announce and not follow through. It is 
important to note that as many papers have stated [e.g., Dittmar (2000)], the decision to 
repurchase is likely attributable to multiple motives and it is doubtful that all firms announcing 
repurchase programs are impelled by a singular motive. Regardless of the motivation behind the 
firm’s decision to repurchase, it is interesting to study the impact of the degree of the voluntary 
compliance. 
2.2  Repurchase Completion Rates as a Form of Voluntary Compliance 
Statements made in one of the U.S. Security and Exchange Commision’s 2003 releases 
suggest that zero completion could be subject to legal ramifications: “If an issuer announced a 
repurchase program, but had no intention to make purchases, it may violate the anti-fraud and 
anti-manipulation provisions of the federal securities laws.”11  However, according to Banyi, Dyl 
and Kahle (2005, p. 2), “No legal obligation is incurred when a firm announces an intention to 
repurchase shares in the open market.”  As a result of this commitment flexibility, compliance 
with repurchase programs is not considered mandatory in Canada or the U.S. [Oded (2005); 
Grullon and Ikenberry (2000)].  For Canadian firms, Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen 
(2000) document the mean completion rate within one year of the repurchase announcement to 
be 28.6 percent. For U.S. firms, Stephens and Weisbach (1998) report the mean completion rate 
                                                 
11 Securities and Exchange Commission [Release Nos. 33-8335; 34-48766; IC-26252; File No. 
S7-50-02] retrieved from:  http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8335.htm 
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within three years of the announcement to be in the range of 74 to 82 percent of the announced 
program.   
It is possible that repurchase completion rates, as a measure of the firm’s voluntary 
compliance, may be an important means of reducing information asymmetry. Voluntary 
compliance may reveal to the market the responsibility of firm’s management and whether this 
management is making good-faith efforts in complying with their announcements.  Badrinath, 
Varaiya and Ferling (2001, p. 43) suggest that “completing a repurchase signals the level of 
commitment that the underlying firm has to the repurchase program.”  If a firm complies 
voluntarily with its announced repurchase program even when it faces no penalties if it fails to 
do so, this signals that the firm does not make spurious promises. In other words, this may 
convey information to the market about the integrity of the firm, particularly as it relates to its 
reliability in following through on its announced actions.  Several other studies also suggest that 
voluntary compliance in the form of repurchase completion may be reflective of some aspect of 
the firm’s quality. For example, Chan, Ikenberry, Lee and Wang (2005) find that repurchasing 
firms with low earnings quality (i.e. high discretionary accruals) have significantly lower 
repurchase program completion rates than repurchasing firms with high earnings quality.  
Lending evidence to the issue of firm quality, Moore (2005) suggests that the degree of 
fulfillment of a firm’s repurchase program in the past is a credibility indicator of subsequent 
repurchase fulfillment.  Mishra, Racine and Schmidt (2007) find empirical support for a positive 
association between a firm’s completion credibility and the market reaction to subsequent 
repurchase announcements. They reason that firms that fail to complete their repurchase 
programs will be perceived by investors as being less credible than firms that do complete their 
programs.   
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Research suggests that various factors play a role in determining the portion of the intended 
program that the firm actually repurchases.  Kirch, BarNiv and Zucca (1998) find that the 
fulfilling and non-fulfilling firms in their sample differ in terms of firm size and profitability.  In 
particular, fulfilling firms tend to be larger (evaluated by total assets and total sales in the 
announcement year) and more profitable compared to non-fulfilling firms.  Relative program 
size (measured as the number of shares targeted for repurchase as a fraction of the firm’s total 
shares outstanding) does not appear to be a factor. 
2.3  Voluntary Compliance as a Means of Disclosure  
Although the literature does not explicitly refer to share repurchases as disclosures, we build 
on insights provided by Easley and O’Hara (2004, p. 1556), particularly that disclosure is a 
mechanism whereby private information is turned into public information. Proponents of the 
information signaling motive for repurchases contend that managers employ repurchases as a 
means of communicating their private information to the market, thereby converting their private 
information into public information in a semi-strong form efficient market. For example, Billett 
and Xue (2004) discuss the notion that payout policy can be used to convey private information 
to the market and furthermore, share repurchases are important in communicating value-relevant 
information.   In discussing repurchases, Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) contend 
that the traditional signaling motive of repurchases results from asymmetric information between 
firm managers and the market. Information asymmetry is a common motivating factor behind the 
voluntary disclosures made by firms and their participation in share repurchase activity.  
According to Stephens and Weisbach (1998, p. 316), “there is substantial evidence that 
asymmetric information is an important determinant of the initiation of repurchase programs.”  
The signaling rationale in conjunction with the implications of papers on information disclosure 
leads us to reason that firms may be potentially able to lower their costs of capital by voluntarily 
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complying with their repurchase announcements because in doing so, they convey to the market 
that they abide by their promises (i.e. their integrity), which lowers information asymmetries 
between the firm and its investors.  
2.4  Information Disclosure and the Cost of Equity Capital 
Several theories which relate disclosure and the cost of capital rely on the concept of 
information asymmetry.  For example, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) explain that costs are created 
from information asymmetries because these asymmetries introduce adverse selection into 
transactions between buyers and sellers of firm shares.  These increased costs are reflected in the 
firm’s cost of capital and researchers suggest that by disclosing information to the market, firms 
can lower the level of information asymmetry, which in turn lowers the cost of capital.  In 
rationalizing the effects of voluntary disclosure on the firm’s cost of capital, the literature has 
gone in two main directions.   
 The first rationale involves the implications of information asymmetry among investors.  
Theory advanced in the models of Demsetz (1968), Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and 
Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985) suggests that adverse selection generally materializes in the 
form of low levels of liquidity in firm securities and that information plays a role in influencing 
liquidity levels.  In particular, uninformed investors concerned that they will be exploited by 
informed investors engage in price-protection in anticipation of losses to their more-informed 
counterparts.  They do so by lowering the price at which they are willing to buy and raising the 
price at which they are willing to sell, effectively widening the spread and thus reducing the 
liquidity.  On this basis, several papers contribute to the notion that superior information 
disclosure lowers information asymmetry among investors, which reduces the bid-ask spread and 
improves market liquidity, thus diminishing the cost of capital.  For instance, Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986) propose that stocks with larger bid-ask spreads have higher costs of equity 
  21
capital due to the compensation demanded by investors for the higher trading costs they incur.  
They maintain that firms may be able to lower their cost of capital by enhancing the liquidity of 
their stock.  Although Amihud and Mendelson (1986) do not explicitly discuss the issue of 
disclosure, the connection between liquidity and disclosure is substantiated by several papers, 
including Welker (1995), Coller and Yohn (1997), Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999), and 
Bloomfield and Wilks (2000).  Also in line with the liquidity explanation, Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1991) associate information disclosure with the reduction in the cost of capital due 
to increased prices (resulting from increased demand).  They assert that increased demand arises 
because information disclosure alleviates information asymmetry, making large investors more 
willing to make large trades.  Easley and O’Hara (2004) theorize that the cost of capital of a firm 
is influenced by its information structure and more specifically, investors require superior returns 
for holding stocks with more private information and less public information.  According to 
them, “private information thus induces a new form of systematic risk, and in equilibrium 
investors require compensation for this risk” (p.1554).  Their explanation suggests that the 
increased return is attributable to the increased risk that private information represents to 
uninformed investors for holding the stock considering that informed investors are more able to 
modify their portfolio weights in response to new information.   
The second rationale often cited by researchers in relating disclosure and cost of capital is 
based on investors’ estimation risk.  This risk is a result of the uncertainty faced by investors in 
estimating the parameters of a security’s return distribution, which is pertinent in determining the 
value and allocation of their investments.  If this risk cannot be diversified away, as was 
suggested by Clarkson, Guedes and Thompson (1996), then investors demand compensation in 
the form of a higher return thus increasing the cost of equity capital. Researchers conjecture that 
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increased voluntary disclosure can lower information asymmetries, thus lowering the uncertainty 
that investors face in their estimation and in doing so reducing the firm’s cost of capital. Barry 
and Brown (1985) and Handa and Linn (1993) use models incorporating differential information 
to show the premium required by investors for assuming the estimation risk arising from 
information asymmetries between managers and investors.   
Empirical findings tend to support the theories.  A negative association between voluntary 
disclosure and cost of capital is reported by Poshakwale and Courtis (2005), who find 
corroborating evidence in the banking industry of various countries.  Botosan (1997) finds 
evidence that greater disclosure is related to a lower cost of equity capital (for her subset of firms 
with lower analyst following).   
The associations between concepts discussed in Section 2.2 (repurchase completion rates as a 
form of voluntary compliance); Section 2.3 (voluntary compliance as a means of disclosure); and 
Section 2.4 (information disclosure and the cost of equity capital) are summarized in Figure 2.1. 
We consider the firm’s repurchase program completion rate to be one indicator of voluntary 
compliance. This voluntary compliance is a means of information disclosure which serves to 
reduce information asymmetries between the firm and the market and thus lowers the firm’s cost 
of equity capital. 
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This study examines whether the percentage of repurchase program completion is negatively 
related to the cost of equity capital.  We postulate that investors may demand a lower return from 
firms that voluntarily comply with their announced repurchase programs because the voluntary 
compliance discloses information to investors about the integrity of the firm in fulfilling their 
promises, reducing information asymmetries between the firm and its investors and as a result, 
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This figure illustrates the relationships between the concepts examined in the 
current study and serve to summarize the ideas discussed in Sections 2.2, 2.3 
and 2.4. 
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2.5  The Implied Cost of Equity Estimation Approach 
Estimates of the cost of equity capital are a key concern in investment decision-making.  They 
are used by firms and shareholders (where the cost of equity represents the shareholder’s 
expected rate of return) for purposes of valuation and also in the assessment of investment 
opportunities.  In general, researchers have been using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to 
estimate the cost of equity. Under this approach, historical returns are used to obtain factor 
loadings.  Despite the prevalence of its use, the CAPM is not without criticism.  According to 
Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001, p. 136), “the cost-of-capital estimates derived from 
average realized returns have proven disappointing in many regards.” Fama and French (1997) 
document imprecision in estimates of industry cost of equity obtained from the CAPM and the 
Fama and French (1993) three-factor model.  They suggest that problems in cost of equity 
estimation result from problems in identifying the correct asset pricing model, imprecision in 
estimates of factor sensitivities (they vary through time) as well as imprecision in estimates of 
risk premiums. They also contend that estimates for firms and projects would be even less 
precise in these circumstances.  Elton (1999) specifically addresses the use of realized returns in 
asset pricing models.  He explains that returns can be conceptually broken down into an expected 
return component and an unexpected return component.  The unexpected return component is a 
result of firm specific events.  He explains that the use of realized returns as a proxy for expected 
returns follows from the notion that unexpected returns are independent and that positive and 
negative unexpected returns cancel out over time, giving a mean of zero and consequently 
providing an unbiased estimate of expected returns.  Elton (1999) asserts that information 
surprises may be so substantial that they have a permanent impact on the mean of the unexpected 
return component or that a succession of information surprises is correlated such that the 
cumulative impact is substantial enough to have an effect.  He further suggests that these 
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surprises can considerably influence the estimate of returns.  For these reasons, Elton (1999, 
p.1199) contends that realized returns are “a very poor measure” of expected returns and 
encourages the search for alternative proxies for expected returns. 
Guay, Kothari and Shu (2005, p. 6) explain that “Accumulated evidence on the properties of 
the cost of capital estimates in the finance literature provides the impetus for estimating the cost 
of capital using forward-looking earnings information rather than historical stock returns.” 
Fortunately, a search for potential alternative methods of estimation has given rise to an 
approach generally termed the “implied cost of equity estimation approach” whereby the cost of 
equity is estimated as the discount rate which equates the current share price with the present 
value of expected future earnings (analyst forecasts of earnings are used as proxies for the 
expected future earnings).  Models proposed by Claus and Thomas (2001, hereafter CT), 
Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001, hereafter GLS), Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005, 
hereafter OJ) [as applied in Gode and Mohanram (2003)], and Easton (2004, hereafter ES) are 
among some of the estimation approaches that have recently been popular.  These models rely on 
differing assumptions regarding forecast horizon and terminal growth.  Recent research has 
employed a number of these approaches. Among them, Botosan (1997) examines the effect of 
disclosure level on the firm’s cost of equity capital, using the OJ model to compute implied cost 
of equity.  Dhaliwal, Krull, Li and Moser (2005) measure the impact of dividend taxes on the 
cost of equity of firms and rely mainly on the GLS model of estimation, although they also verify 
their results by examining estimates of the CT and OJ models. Hail and Leuz (2006) (whose 
research framework we follow) use the four abovementioned models to measure firms’ implied 
cost of equity and investigate the effect of country-specific legal institutions and securities 
regulation on cross-country differences in cost of equity capital.  Dhaliwal, Heitzman and Li 
  26
(2006) also apply these four models to examine the influence of taxes and leverage on the firm’s 
cost of equity. 
Given their underlying assumptions, these four models capture different sets of important 
information. For example, Easton (2004, p. 75) suggests that abnormal earnings growth models 
incorporate earnings information based on the income statement whereas residual income 
valuation models incorporate book value information based on the balance sheet. Ohlson (2000) 
states that residual income valuation models incorporate book value information through the use 
of the clean surplus assumption and that this assumption rarely holds in practice. Due to these 
differing views, it is not clear a priori which model is more appropriate or applicable. In fact, 
several papers specifically state that there is no consensus over the superiority of one particular 
model [Dhaliwal, Heitzman and Li (2006, p. 699); Witmer and Zorn (2007, p. 17)]. This is what 
leads them to focus their analysis on the simple average of the four estimates, a practice also 
followed by Hail and Leuz (2006). Combining estimates is a common approach used in 
forecasting. Makridakis and Winkler (1983, p. 995) maintain that “using averages of forecasts 
provides considerable practical benefits in terms of improved forecasting accuracy and decreased 




DATA DESCRIPTION AND METHODOLOGY 
We perform our analysis on open-market share repurchases in Canada.  Canadian firms are 
required by law to report the number of shares repurchased every month and repurchase 
programs have a specific timeframe of 12 months in which to voluntarily complete their 
programs, whereas U.S. repurchases have no mandated termination period [Grullon and 
Ikenberry (2000)]. Further, until recently U.S. firms were not required to report the amount of 
shares repurchased.   In addition, the provisions governing share repurchase programs are 
relatively ambiguous in the U.S. compared to Canada [Grullon and Ikenberry (2000)].  As a 
result, if completion rates have an impact on the cost of equity capital of repurchasing firms, it 
will be more apparent in results obtained from Canadian data.12    
3.1  Sample Construction 
The sample used in our analysis consists of 154 Canadian open-market share repurchases 
announced between January 1995 and December 2004.  Canadian share repurchase program data 
are provided by Schmidt (2006), which he manually gathered from summaries of Normal Course 
                                                 
12 We also examine completed U.S. open-market share repurchase programs announced between 
1995 and 2004 for which the “latest completion date” fell within 12 months of the initial 
repurchase authorization date.  Repurchase authorization dates and completion rates were 
obtained from Thomson Financial’s SDC Platinum Mergers and Acquisitions database.  Our 
sample contains 302 observations.  Descriptive statistics of the completion rate show a mean of 
93.2%, standard deviation of 31.06%, minimum of 0.46%, first quartile of 87.15%, median of 
100%, third quartile of 100% and maximum of 203.38%.  From the summary statistics, it is clear 
that very little variation is observed in the completion rate (median and third quartile are both 
100%).  Also the standard deviation is lower than that of the Canadian data set, despite the 




Issuer Bids (a term used in Canada for open-market share repurchases) contained in the Toronto 
Stock Exchange’s Daily Record publication.  The dataset contains the name of the repurchasing 
firm, the repurchase announcement date, and the program completion rate.  We merge this 
dataset with Compustat and I/B/E/S data; the former provides book value per share, dividend 
payout and other financial data, and the latter provides analyst earnings forecasts and price data 
required in all four implied cost of equity models.   Following the framework of Hail and Leuz 
(2006), restrictions on our sample require that each repurchase program observation has all of the 
following: 
1) completion rate and announcement date must be available 
2) corresponding data in I/B/E/S and Compustat 
3) non-negative one- and two-year-ahead earnings forecasts 
4) either a three-year-ahead earnings forecast or a long-term growth rate 
5) a minimum of two analysts providing forecasts in each of the one- and two-year-ahead 
cases 
6) market share price for the year of the forecast 
7) book value per share must be available 
8) non-negative dividend payout ratio in Compustat 
In addition to these considerations, it is important to note that I/B/E/S data contains analyst 
forecasts made several times throughout a given year.  In computing cost of equity estimates, the 
earliest available earnings forecast after the repurchase completion period is used for each firm-
year.   
 To describe the sample construction process in more detail, the original dataset provided 
by Schmidt (2006) contains 2,458 Canadian share repurchases announced between January 1995 
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and December 2005.  We use four items from his data: the ticker symbol of the repurchasing 
firm, the repurchasing firm name, the repurchase program completion rate and the date of the 
repurchase announcement.  Of the 2,458 observations in the original dataset, we exclude 350 
observations because either the completion rate or the announcement date is unavailable, leaving 
a total of 2,108 observations (2,108 repurchase programs announced between January 1995 and 
December 2004 belonging to 799 individual firms).  
 As previously mentioned, the computation of cost of equity estimates based on chosen 
models necessitates the merging of the repurchases dataset with data gathered from Compustat 
and I/B/E/S.  This is done to obtain the book value per share from Compustat and the forecasted 
earnings per share and price per share at the time of repurchase announcement from I/B/E/S.  To 
facilitate this merge, datasets for Compustat and I/B/E/S are first matched together.  The 
matching process occurs in two rounds, the first of which involves matching by the first six 
digits of firms’ CUSIP identifiers as well as the years to which the data correspond.  The data 
that remain unmatched after the first round are carried on to the next round of matching.  The 
second round match involves matching by the firm name and also again with the years to which 
the data correspond.  This step is complicated by differences in the way that each database 
(Compustat and I/B/E/S) chooses to record and present the firm name, for instance the use of 
abbreviations (e.g. FNL for Financial).  These difficulties are addressed by programming a 
function that computes a similarity rating which assigns penalties for each specific instance of 
dissimilarity between the firm name presented in Compustat and the one presented in I/B/E/S.  
The data is then sorted by this similarity rating score.  Matches with a score of zero indicate a 
perfect name match.  Scores higher than zero are manually verified to assess the accuracy of the 
match.  After effectively matching the Compustat and I/B/E/S data, the combined dataset is then 
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merged with the repurchases set of 2,108 observations. Because the original dataset provided by 
Schmidt (2006) contains only the repurchasing firm name and the ticker symbol as firm 
identifiers, merging the repurchases set with the Compustat and I/B/E/S set is possible only by 
matching by firm name (using the method of rating character similarities as mentioned just 
prior).  It is also important to note that the combined Compustat and I/B/E/S dataset is matched 
with the repurchases data one year following the year of the repurchase announcement.  For 
example if a firm announces a repurchase in January 2000, the repurchase period is taken to be 
12 months, so the month of completion is considered to be January 2001.  Compustat data (book 
value per share, dividend payout, and other variables) are obtained for the year 2001 and analyst 
earnings forecasts are obtained from I/B/E/S for the month following the completion month, in 
our example, forecasts would be obtained for February 2001.  If forecasts are unavailable for that 
month, the first available forecasts are obtained, for example, for March 2001, and if those are 
not available, then the following month’s forecasts are obtained. For the final sample of 154 
observations, 25 did not have forecast data available in the 13th month, necessitating the use of 
forecast data for later months. This represents 16.2% of the final sample. Replicating the 
regressions in Table 4.1 after omitting these 25 observations led to results which are largely 
consistent with the findings obtained from the full sample of 154 observations. Completion rate 
and completion rate dummy coefficients remain statistically insignificant, consistent with results 
obtained from the full sample. 
Observations in our sample with dividend payout ratios higher than 100 percent, as reported 
by Compustat, are truncated at 100 percent.  Furthermore, for observations with data unavailable 
for the dividend payout ratio, the assumption made in this study is a payout ratio of 50 percent.  
Claus and Thomas (2001) use a 50 percent payout ratio to forecast upcoming dividends from 
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forecasted earnings.  They also try payout ratios ranging from 25 to 75 percent and observe little 
effect on their discount rate estimations [See Claus and Thomas (2001), p. 1640]. Focusing on 
the dividend payout adjustments, out of the final sample of 154 observations, 5 observations 
(with dividend payout exceeding 100%) were truncated to 100% which represents 3.2% of the 
sample. No observations from the final sample were subject to the 50% payout assumption. 
Results obtained from regressions excluding the 5 observations were very similar to the results 
obtained from the full sample; the completion rate coefficient was insignificant and the 
coefficient magnitudes and significance levels of the other independent variables were also very 
similar to results from the full sample. 
 After eliminating observations that fail to fulfill data requirements, the sample consists of 
209 repurchase programs, belonging to 81 firms. After estimation of the four models, 17 
observations are removed because numerical solutions are not obtainable (3 observations fail to 
converge in the CT model, 15 observations are undefined in the OJ model, and 10 observations 
are undefined in the ES model).  The final sample contains 192 repurchase programs, belonging 
to 77 unique firms.  This study, however, also requires the repurchasing firm have sufficient 
available returns from the Canadian Financial Markets Research Centre (CFMRC) database for 
the estimation of the market beta to be used as an explanatory variable in the later regression 
analysis.  We require monthly returns for a minimum of 24 of the 60 months prior to the month 
analyst earnings forecasts are recorded in I/B/E/S which restricts the dataset to 154 observations 
belonging to 64 firms. The number of repurchase programs per firm in this final data set ranges 
from one program to seven programs, though the majority are at the lower end of the spectrum. 
The breakdown of the number of announced programs per firm is as follows: 29 firms announce 
just one program; 11 firms announce two programs; 11 firms announce three programs; 2 firms 
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announce four programs; 5 firms announce five programs; 5 firms announce six programs; 1 firm 
announces seven programs. Details of the sample construction are summarized in Table 3.1. 
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3.2  Implied Cost of Equity Capital Estimation 
We examine the impact of voluntary compliance of Canadian repurchasing firms on the cost 
of equity capital in the year following the repurchase announcement.  That is, we compute the 
cost of equity in the month immediately after the repurchase completion month (which is taken 
to be 12 months after the announcement month).  If data is not available for the month 
immediately subsequent to the completion month, then cost of equity estimates are computed for 
the earliest subsequent month with available data.  For instance if the repurchase announcement 
is made in January 2000, the completion month is considered to be 12 months after (January 
2001) and we compute the cost of equity using analyst earnings forecasts made in February 2001 
if available (or if unavailable, the first subsequent available month).  The one year time frame is 
chosen because Canadian regulation allows the repurchasing firm 12 months to carry out the 
open-market repurchase program.   
The cost of equity estimate is a simple average of the estimates of each of the four models 
described in Sections 3.2.1 to 3.2.4.  An average is taken because there is a lack of consensus 
over the superiority of any one model.  For example, Guay, Kothari and Shu (2005) suggest the 
Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001) estimate is a good predictor of future realized returns. 
But Botosan and Plumlee (2005) suggest that the relationship between the Gebhardt, Lee and 
Swaminathan (2001) estimate and traditional risk proxies is inconsistent.  Differences between 
the models are mainly reflected in their treatments of the forecast horizon and steady state 
growth rate. As such, each model may be considered to have its strengths and weaknesses.  For 
instance, the Claus and Thomas (2001) model assumes a forecast horizon of five years and the 
growth rate beyond the terminal year is assumed to equal the inflation rate. The longer forecast 
horizon may be appealing because it is more realistic. However, many analysts make one- and 
two-year-ahead forecasts, but relatively few analysts provide five-year-ahead earnings forecasts. 
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Thus the longer horizon forecasts may be less reliable and this is a potential weakness for models 
such as the CT model.   
The Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001) model assumes a forecast horizon of 12 years 
and additionally assumes that the firm’s return on equity reverts to the industry average return on 
equity after the terminal year.  One of the potential strengths of this model is that it incorporates 
industry information. The Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) model makes no explicit 
assumptions about the terminal year but assumes that steady state growth is equivalent to the rate 
of inflation [consistent with the Claus and Thomas (2001) model].  A potential strength of the 
Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005)  model is that only the one- and two-year-ahead earnings 
forecasts are necessary for the model’s estimation, and the model does not involve book value or 
return on equity forecasts, making dividend assumptions unnecessary beyond the forecasted one-
year-ahead dividend per share.    
The Easton (2004) model also makes no explicit assumptions about the terminal year 
[consistent with the Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) model] and furthermore makes no 
assumptions regarding abnormal earnings growth beyond two years.  Some might argue that the 
seemingly more simplistic approach of the Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) and Easton 
(2004) models represents an advantage over the other models due to fewer assumptions about 
payout and the requirement of only the one- and two-year ahead earnings forecasts for 
estimation, while others may argue that the additional assumptions of the Claus and Thomas 
(2001)  and Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001) approaches make these models superior 
because explicit assumptions are realistically necessary. Researchers are cautious when using 
implied cost of equity estimates, paying particular attention to the sensitivity of estimates to 
measurement error and noise [see for example, Guay, Kothari and Shu (2005)]. We take these 
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collective factors into account and use the equally-weighted average across the four cost of 
equity estimates as the estimate in our study.  By taking an average of the four models, we follow 
the methodology of Hail and Leuz (2006) and Dhaliwal, Heitzman and Li (2006).  According to 
them, “aggregating across the four models reduces some measurement error” [Hail and Leuz 
(2006, p. 493)] and serves to “mitigate the effect that particular assumptions of each model might 
have” on results [Dhaliwal, Heitzman and Li (2006, p. 700)]. In the following sections, 3.2.1 to 
3.2.4, each model is discussed in more detail and a summary comparison is presented in Table 
3.2 at the end of Section 3.2.4. 
3.2.1   The Claus and Thomas (2001) Approach 
We will refer to this approach as the CT model. As previously mentioned, the CT model is a 
version of the Edwards-Bell-Ohlson residual income valuation model, which itself is derived 
from the classic dividend discount model and relies on explicit definitions of income and residual 
income.  The CT model is based on book values and forecasted earnings for five years in the 























ττ   (3.1) 
Where: 
=t  the repurchase announcement year + 1. 
=tP  the price per share at time t  (obtained at the time the analyst forecasts are recorded 
in I/B/E/S). 
=tB  the fiscal year end book value per share (obtained from Compustat). 
=+τtEPS  the one- to five-year-ahead mean earnings per share forecast (obtained from 
I/B/E/S). =g  the growth rate beyond five years.  At that time, residual earnings are assumed to 
grow at the inflation rate, which we compute as the annualized percentage change 
in the consumer price index (retrieved from Statistics Canada’s CANSIM database 
for year t ). 
=CTK  the cost of equity capital as estimated by equating the two sides of equation (3.1).  
The subscript refers to the CT model.  Subscripts will be used to identify estimates 
from each of the models. 
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=+itB  the book value per share of future periods and is estimated using an accounting 
identity known as the clean-surplus relation shown in equation (3.2). 
 
itititit DEPSBB ++−++ −+= 1         (3.2) 
The clean-surplus relationship is based on the idea that all gains and losses are reflected in net 
income.  Changes in book value arise from income and dividends (here, itEPS +  denotes the 
forecasted earnings per share and itD +  denotes dividends per share which is computed as the 
dividend payout ratio (obtained from Compustat) multiplied by forecasted earnings per share).  
The dividend payout ratio is used if it is available from Compustat. Otherwise we assume a 
payout ratio of 50 percent of forecasted earnings, following Claus and Thomas (2001).  We also 
impose a maximum payout ratio of 100 percent of forecasted earnings.  
 As outlined in the restrictions of our sample construction, observations must have a one-
year-ahead and two-year-ahead forecast to be included in our sample, as well as either a three-
year-ahead forecast or a long-term growth rate.  All of the forecasts are used if available. In cases 
where the long-term growth rate is unavailable, it is estimated as the mean growth rate computed 
from the one-, two- and three-year-ahead forecasts. If the three-year-ahead forecast is 
unavailable, it is estimated using the long-term growth rate and the two-year-ahead forecast.  In 
cases where the four-year-ahead forecast is unavailable, it is estimated with the long-term growth 
rate (where available, otherwise with the estimated growth rate) and the three-year-ahead 
forecast. Similarly, the method is employed to estimate the five-year-ahead forecast if it is 
unavailable. 
3.2.2   The Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001) Approach 
This approach, which we will refer to as the GLS model, is based on the same residual income 
valuation framework as the CT model.  However, several key features distinguish the GLS 
model from the CT model, notably the forecast horizon and terminal value assumptions, as well 
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as the distinctive approach of the GLS model in incorporating industry return on equity into the 
valuation.  

















ττ    (3.3) 
Where: 
=t  the repurchase announcement year + 1. 
=tP  the price per share at time t  (obtained at the time the analyst forecasts are recorded 
in I/B/E/S). 
=tB  the fiscal year end book value per share (obtained from Compustat). 
=+τtEPS  the one- to three-year-ahead mean earnings per share forecast (obtained from 
I/B/E/S). 
=GLSK  the cost of equity capital as estimated by equating the two sides of equation (3.3). 
=+itB  the book value per share of future periods and is estimated using the clean-surplus 
relation previously shown in equation (3.2). 
  
 
Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001) re-specify equation (3.3) using the relationship 
between return-on-equity, earnings per share, and book value per share shown in equation (3.4) 
to obtain an alternative specification [equation (3.3a)] of the original model which is re-arranged 




































ROEROE industry median  12 =  
 
The GLS model requires a two-stage approach to estimation.  First, it entails a three-year 
explicit forecast horizon.  In other words, the one- through three-year-ahead explicit forecasts of 
earnings per share (obtained from I/B/E/S) are used to compute the return-on-equity (ROE) 
values for years t + 1 through t + 3.  Second, the ROE values for years t + 4 through t + 12 are 
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implicitly forecasted by linearly mean-reverting the ROE at time t + 3 to the median industry 
ROE (computed at the two-digit SIC code level from the sample for the entire sample period). 
The mean-reversion is accomplished with the use of straight linear interpolation and is intended 
to exhibit the convergence in characteristics of firms in the same industry over the long-run.  
Lastly, the model estimates value beyond year t + 12 by computing the residual earnings at t + 12 
as a perpetuity and discounts this value back to time t.  It is important to note, however, that the 
model does not make the assumption that earnings or cash flow stop growing after year t + 12, 
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(3.3b) 
 
Equation (3.3b) is mathematically the same as equation (3.3a), but serves to further clarify the 
approach by showing the breakdown of the first two stages of estimation.  As in the manner of 
the CT model, the cost of equity of the GLS model is estimated by solving for the value of GLSK  
that equates the two sides of equation (3.3b).   
3.2.3   The Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) Approach 
We will refer to this approach as the OJ model and we largely follow assumptions made by 
Gode and Mohanram (2003).  The OJ model is structured on the firm’s abnormal change in 
earnings which is specifically computed in excess of the return required by investors for the 
firm’s retention of earnings.  A key feature of the OJ model is that it does not restrict the short 
term growth rate to equal the long term growth rate. Rather, it permits the possibility that the two 
may differ, and the short term growth will eventually decline towards the asymptotic long term 




















=t  the repurchase announcement year + 1. 
=tP  the price per share at time t  (obtained at the time the analyst forecasts are recorded 
in I/B/E/S). 
=+1tEPS  the one-year-ahead mean earnings per share forecast (obtained from I/B/E/S). 
=+2tEPS  the two-year-ahead mean earnings per share forecast (obtained from I/B/E/S). 
=+1tD  the dividend per share (computed as the dividend payout ratio (obtained from 
Compustat) multiplied by the forecasted earnings per share). 









=LTg  the long term growth rate.  In our study it is assumed to equal the inflation rate, 
which we compute as the annualized percentage change in the consumer price 
index (retrieved from Statistics Canada’s CANSIM database for year t ). 
=OJK  the cost of equity capital as determined by equation (3.5). 
 
In order for the model to obtain a numerical solution, the difference between the one-year-
ahead and two-year-ahead earnings forecasts must be positive (yielding a positive short term 
growth rate), and the short term growth rate must be greater than the long term growth rate.  In 
other words, the value within the square root of equation (3.5) must be positive. 
3.2.4   The Easton (2004) Approach 
This approach will be referred to as the ES model.  It is based on the OJ model which is 
concerned with abnormal earnings growth valuation. As in the OJ model, the ES model involves 
forecasted earnings values for one and two years ahead as well as forecasted dividends per share 
and the actual price per share. The ES model assumes that abnormal earnings growth continues 







EPSDKEPSP +++ −⋅+=       (3.6) 
Where: 
=t  the repurchase announcement year + 1. 
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=tP  the price per share at time t  (obtained at the time the analyst forecasts are recorded 
in I/B/E/S). 
=+1tEPS  the one-year-ahead mean earnings per share forecast (obtained from I/B/E/S). 
=+2tEPS  the two-year-ahead mean earnings per share forecast (obtained from I/B/E/S). 
=+1tD  the dividend per share (computed as the dividend payout ratio (obtained from 
Compustat) multiplied by the forecasted earnings per share). 
=ESK  the cost of equity capital as estimated by equating the two sides of equation (3.6). 
 
The cost of equity is estimated for each repurchase program observation for the Claus and 
Thomas (2001) model, Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001) model and the Easton (2004) 
model by minimizing the difference between the share price and the discounted value of future 
cash flows.   Estimates for the Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) model are obtained directly 
without the need for optimization techniques.  
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Table 3.2  Summary of Similarities and Differences among the Four Estimation Models 
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using 5 year 
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rate for years 3 to 5) 
12 years ahead:  
Year 1 to 3 explicit 
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3rd year based on 
five year growth 
rate), then for year 4 
to 12, implicitly 
forecasted by fading 
ROE such that 
firm’s ROE12 is 
equal to median 
industry ROE 
 
2 years ahead 2 years ahead 
Growth 
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beyond 5 years (set 
equal to inflation) 
Zero growth beyond 




beyond 2 years (set 
equal to inflation) 
Steady growth 




Yes Yes No No 
Other Assumptions 
 
  2 growth rates used: 
short term and long 
term 
Abnormal earnings 
growth persists into 
perpetuity 
 
This table compares and contrasts the characteristics of the four cost of equity estimation approaches used in this 
study.  
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As described, the CT, GLS, OJ, and ES models share similarities but are also different in a 
number of ways. A summary comparison of the four models is shown in Table 3.2. Key 
differences between the models are model type and forecast horizon. The models fall under two 
categories: residual income valuation models (CT and GLS) and abnormal earnings growth 
models (OJ and ES). The forecast horizon is five years for the CT model, 12 years for the GLS 
model and two years for the OJ and ES models. 
 
Table 3.3  Summary Statistics of RP Estimates 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of RP Estimates 
Variable N Mean 
Std 
Dev Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
RPCT 154 6.70% 6.50% -1.60% 4.30% 5.90% 7.70% 73.30%
RPGLS 154 5.60 3.10 -1.50 3.40 5.80 7.50 19.90 
RPOJ 154 8.40 4.50 -0.90 5.90 7.60 9.70 29.90 
RPES 154 7.90 4.30 0.20 5.50 7.10 9.00 29.50 
RP 154 7.10 3.40 -0.30 4.90 6.90 8.50 24.40 
Panel B: Pearson Correlation Coefficients of RP Estimates 
 RPCT RPGLS RPOJ RPES  
RPGLS 0.1926      
RPOJ 0.3268 0.2547     
RPES 0.3318 0.3032 0.9936    
RP 0.7248 0.4967 0.8481 0.8614   
This table reports the summary statistics of the estimates obtained from each of the 
models discussed in Section 3.2. Panel A contains descriptive statistics while Panel B 
contains Pearson correlations between estimates. Correlations are bolded to indicate 
statistical significance at the 1% level. The sample contains 154 observations belonging 
to 64 firms. 
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Table 3.3 Panel A displays summary statistics for the cost of equity estimates of our sample of 
repurchase programs.  Estimates obtained from the abnormal earnings growth models (ES and 
OJ) exceed those of the residual income valuation models (CT and GLS).  This is consistent with 
prior research, such as Guay, Kothari and Shu (2005), Hail and Leuz (2006), and Dhaliwal, 
Heitzman and Li (2006).  Also consistent with our estimates, these studies report that their GLS 
estimates tend to be the lowest and their OJ estimates are the highest across the four models.  
Here, the simple average cost of equity estimate in excess of the risk free rate, RP, has a mean of 
7.10% and correlations of the four model estimates with the simple average estimate range from 
49.67% (GLS estimate) to 86.14% (ES estimate).  As expected, the estimates are positively 
correlated with each other. The correlation between the OJ model and ES model estimates is the 
highest [consistent with Dhaliwal, Heitzman and Li (2006)] which is unsurprising because of 
their similar assumptions (see Table 3.2). 
3.3  Explanatory Variables used in Regression Analysis 
We use a cross sectional regression model to study the impact of various factors on the cost of 
equity (the equation of this model is provided in Section 4).  The dependent variable of the 
model is the estimate of the cost of equity and the primary test variable is the repurchase 
program completion rate (the measure of voluntary compliance).  
In addition to the primary test variable, we also include a number of firm-level controls: size, 
growth, dispersion of analyst forecasts, the ratio of market to book, leverage, industry 
membership and firm beta.  In particular, we use Analyst Coverage as a proxy for firm size.  The 
inclusion of the size variable is motivated by Fama and French (1992) who consider size to be a 
factor in explaining some of the cross-sectional variation in returns, formally incorporating the 
size effect documented by Banz (1981). We reason that the larger the firm, the lower the 
associated information asymmetries on the basis that larger firms are generally subject to 
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increased exposure and analyst coverage. Gode and Mohanram (2003) contend that firms highly 
linked to information intermediaries (institutional investors and analysts, for instance) are 
associated with lower costs of equity as a result of enhanced information availability, which 
reduces information asymmetry between the firm and the market and reduces the informational 
risk faced by its investors.  Ashbaugh, Collins and LaFond (2004) and Hail and Leuz (2006) 
include a proxy variable for size in their implied cost of equity regressions. Both studies find the 
sign on the coefficient of the size variable to be negative. As an alternative size proxy, we also 
use Log Assets. We take a natural logarithmic transformation of assets in order to reduce 
variance and linearize the relationship between assets and cost of equity, considering the cost of 
equity values are between 0 and 100% while firm asset values do not have an upward bound 
(range of 0 to millions). 
Also included in the regressions is long-term growth in earnings, referred to as Growth. Both 
a positive and negative sign have been predicted for this variable. La Porta (1996) demonstrates 
that high long-term growth firms exhibit lower subsequent returns.  He suggests that this finding 
can be explained by analyst over-optimism in the case of higher long term growth firms.  
Evidence presented by La Porta (1996) prompts Gebhardt, Lee and Swiminathan (2001) to 
expect a negative relation between long-term growth and implied cost of equity. They reason that 
if analysts are likely to be overly optimistic about high long-term growth firms and hence make 
overly optimistic earnings forecasts, then these high long-term growth firms would have overly 
high share prices and their implied cost of equity would be exceedingly low. On the other hand, 
Gode and Mohanram (2003) suggest that this expectation is contingent on whether investors are 
able to recognize the analyst over-optimism and use the appropriate discount rate.  They argue 
that there is difficulty in anticipating how the implied cost of equity will be affected in this case, 
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as it hinges on the relation between price and earnings forecasts.  Gode and Mohanram (2003) 
predict the sign on long-term growth to be positive under the belief that high-growth firms are 
observed by investors as riskier in general.  They suggest that potential errors in growth 
estimation would influence prices substantially.  A positive sign is documented by Dhaliwal, 
Krull, Li and Moser (2005) and Dhaliwal, Heitzman and Li (2006).  Gebhardt, Lee and 
Swaminathan (2001) also find, contrary to their beliefs, a positive relation between long-term 
growth and implied cost of equity in a multivariate setting. 
 We include the dispersion of analyst forecasts, which we refer to as Variance Analyst 
Coverage, as an explanatory variable.  The market perceives higher divergence in forecasts 
among analysts as an indication of uncertainty about the firm’s earnings, thus increasing the 
return they require from the firm.  Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001, p. 146) use dispersion 
of analyst forecasts to proxy for “earnings variability which is likely to capture fundamental cash 
flow risk.” They also suggest that earnings variability translates to firm valuation risk.  We 
therefore predict a positive relation between the volatility of analyst coverage and the cost of 
capital. Empirical literature largely supports this prediction [for example, Dhaliwal, Heitzman 
and Li (2006)].   
 As in the case of the size proxy, the inclusion of the Market to Book variable is largely 
motivated by Fama and French (1992) whose model demonstrates the explanatory power of the 
book to market ratio in relation to the cross-sectional variation of returns. Gebhardt, Lee and 
Swaminathan (2001) suggest that if firms with high book to market ratios (or low Market to 
Book ratios in our case) are undervalued, then these firms would have high implied costs of 
equity until the mispricing is resolved.  Gode and Mohanram (2003) also predict a positive sign 
for the book to market ratio (meaning a negative sign for the Market to Book ratio), though they 
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note that a low Market to Book ratio could be a sign of “lower growth opportunities, lower 
accounting conservatism, or high perceived risk” (p.406) and that there is difficulty in making a 
case for the impact on the cost of equity from these confounding factors.  Gebhardt, Lee and 
Swaminathan (2001) and Dhaliwal, Krull, Li and Moser (2005) find a positive sign for the book 
to market ratio (meaning a negative sign for the Market to Book ratio).  Ashbaugh, Collins and 
LaFond (2004) also find a negative sign on the Market to Book variable in their results. We 
therefore predict a negative sign on the Market to Book variable. 
 Modigliani and Miller (1958) demonstrate that the firm’s cost of equity should be 
positively tied to its leverage; the more the firm is levered, the higher the risk to the firm’s equity 
and therefore the higher the return that is required by shareholders.  Fama and French (1992) 
examine historical returns and report a positive relationship between leverage and stock returns.  
The sign is found to be positive by Gode and Mohanram (2003) and Gebhardt, Lee and 
Swaminathan (2001).  Thus, we predict Leverage has a positive impact on the cost of equity. 
The inclusion of a variable for industry membership, which we refer to as Industry Cost of 
Equity, is motivated by Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001) who find industry effects to be a 
significant factor in cross-sectional variation in implied cost of equity.  In fact, they observe that 
“the market consistently ascribes a higher discount rate to certain industries” (p. 137).  Their 
finding suggests that a firm’s implied cost of equity is potentially associated with its industry 
membership likely as a result of specific industry characteristics (e.g. industry regulation, 
concentration).  Our prediction for the industry average cost of equity is therefore positive.  Hail 
and Leuz (2006) also include industry controls in their regressions and Dhaliwal, Krull, Li and 
Moser (2005) find industry effects to be positively related to the implied cost of equity of firms 
in their sample. 
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 According to the CAPM, the market beta of a firm should be positively associated with 
its cost of equity.  We predict a positive sign for this variable.  A positive sign is also 
documented by Botosan (1997), Gode and Mohanram (2003), Ashbaugh, Collins and LaFond 
(2004), Dhaliwal, Krull, Li and Moser (2005), Dhaliwal, Heitzman and Li (2006) and Hail and 
Leuz (2006). Summary statistics of the variables to be used in the regressions are presented in 
Table 3.4. 
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 Table 3.4  Summary of Regression Variables 





Dev Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
Completion Rate  154 0.29 0.35 0 0 0.12 0.52 1 
Log Assets (Size Proxy)  154 8.49 2.25 3.98 6.89 8.29 9.76 13.06 
Analyst Coverage (Size Proxy)  154 9.07 4.05 2 6 9 12 21 
Growth  154 16.7 16.4 -3.62 9.39 12.77 16.76 145.55 
Variance Analyst Coverage  154 0.1 0.22 0 0.02 0.04 0.1 2.4 
Market to Book  154 2.33 1.07 0.16 1.64 2.24 2.99 7.16 
Leverage  154 44.9 28.71 0 22.29 44.98 56.28 100 
Industry Cost of Equity  154 0.11 0.01 0.08 0.1 0.11 0.11 0.15 
Beta  154 0.49 0.43 -0.34 0.19 0.43 0.73 1.95 
K  154 0.11 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.1 0.11 0.28 
IAK  154 -0 0.03 -0.08 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.17 
RP  154 0.07 0.03 -0 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.24 
 Panel B: Pearson Correlation Coefficients of Regression Variables 
 
Completion 











Beta K IAK 
Log Assets 0.3319           
Analyst Coverage 0.3522 0.4778          
Growth -0.1042 -0.2795 -0.0446         
VAnalystCoverage -0.0740 -0.1914 -0.0719 0.4507        
Market to Book 0.0046 0.0438 0.0599 -0.0067 -0.1732       
Leverage 0.2166 0.5974 0.2019 -0.1847 -0.0764 -0.0150      
IndustCostofEquity 0.2056 0.0334 0.2540 0.2283 0.1799 0.0594 -0.0739     
Beta 0.0123 -0.0070 0.1518 0.1540 0.1223 -0.2845 0.1174 0.0220    
K 0.1153 -0.0991 0.0157 0.4381 0.3586 -0.2701 -0.0793 0.2644 0.1478   
IAK 0.0347 -0.1154 -0.0873 0.3570 0.2951 -0.3016 -0.0513 -0.1358 0.1429 0.9196  
RP 0.0863 -0.0658 0.0148 0.3959 0.3016 -0.2569 -0.0841 0.2327 0.0269 0.9486 0.8797 
 This table reports the summary statistics of the variables used in the regression models of our sample.  Panel A contains descriptive statistics while 
Panel B contains Pearson correlations between variables.  Correlations are bolded to indicate statistical significance at the 1% level.  The sample 
contains 154 observations belonging to 64 firms.  See Table 3.5 for an explanation of variable sources and definitions. 
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From Panel A of Table 3.4, we can see that firms in our sample have repurchased within the 
range of 0 to 100% of their announced programs in the year following their repurchase 
announcements.  On average, firms repurchase 29% of their programs with the majority of firms 
purchasing less than this portion (median of 12%).  Pairwise correlations shown in Panel B 
indicate that the main explanatory variable, Completion Rate, is significantly positively 
correlated with both size proxies (Log Assets and Analyst Coverage) as well as Leverage.  We 
use Analyst Coverage as the main proxy for size because it is correlated with fewer variables 
compared to Log Assets.  A robustness check is performed (results reported in Table 4.3) by 
running the regression with each of the size proxies as well as omitting size altogether in order to 
determine whether the correlation between size and the main test variable has an effect on 
results. By including these variables we control for size, growth, the ratio of market to book 
value, leverage, industry membership and beta so that we can focus on accurately measuring the 
impact of Completion Rate on the firm’s cost of equity. A summary of regression variable 




Table 3.5  Definitions of Regression Variables 
Variable Definition Source 




Calculated as (K – Rf), where the risk free rate for is the 




(Alternative specification for 
dependent variable) 
 
The repurchasing firm’s cost of equity estimate of the cost of 
equity capital. It is an average of the estimates of the four 




(Alternative specification for 
dependent variable) 
 
The industry-adjusted cost of equity estimate, calculated as (K 




(main explanatory variable) 
 
The rate of repurchase program fulfillment. This is defined as 
the number of shares a firm actually repurchases as a fraction 





The natural log of the firm’s total assets.  It serves as an 
alternate control for size (used to verify the robustness of 
results computed using Analyst Coverage as a proxy for size). 
 
Compustat  
Analyst Coverage  
 
The number of analysts providing EPS forecasts for a given 





The mean consensus earnings forecasts of long-term growth. 
 
I/B/E/S 
Volatility Analyst Coverage 
 
The standard deviation of analysts’ one-year-ahead mean EPS 
forecast as a fraction of the one-year-ahead mean forecast. 
 
I/B/E/S 
Market to Book 
 





The ratio of total book value of debt to total capital (market 





Industry Cost of Equity 
 
The average of the implied cost of equity estimates for all 
available firms. Computed at the first-digit SIC code for each 





The CAPM beta estimated from monthly returns for a 
minimum of 24 of the 60 months prior to the month for which 
analyst earnings forecasts are made.  CFMRC value-weighted 
returns are used for the market portfolio and 3-month 





CHAPTER 4     
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
We investigate whether a relationship exists between the firm’s voluntary repurchase 
compliance and its cost of equity capital.  We test whether a higher degree of voluntary 
compliance is associated with lower costs of equity capital in the year following the 
announcement.  In examining this association, we control for various factors which have been 
identified in the literature as having an impact on the implied cost of equity.  Our main model is 
shown in equation (4.1).  It is a cross-sectional regression model.  Note that RP [expected return 
in excess of the risk free (T-bill) rate] is used as the dependent variable in the regression.  
Because the risk free rate is a constant term across all firms in the RP expression, but changes 
every year, the objective here is to control for time-series variation in the risk-free rate and 
potential fixed-year effects (as explained by Hail and Leuz, 2006, p. 496).  Expressing the return 
in excess of the risk free rate is a standard technique in the cost of capital literature [see for 
example, Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001), Gode and Mohanram (2003), Dhaliwal, Krull, 
Li, and Moser (2006)]. 
 
εααα +++= ontrolsFirmLevelCRateCompletionRP 210    (4.1) 
Where: 
=RP   computed as the aggregate cost of equity estimate in excess of the risk 
free rate (annualized Canadian 91-day T-bill rate).  The aggregate cost of 
equity estimate is calculated as the average of estimates computed from 
the four models discussed in Section 3.2 for the most recent month 
subsequent to the share repurchase program end date. 
 
=RateCompletion  the repurchase program completion rate [from the dataset of Schmidt 
(2006)], computed as the number of shares actually repurchased as a 
fraction of the total number of shares authorized for repurchase from the 
initiation to the program end date. 
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=Controls  a set of firm-level control variables described in Section 3.2. 
 
=ε  an error term. 
 
The model was initially run using OLS but White’s (1980) test indicated significant 
heteroskedasticity in the residuals of our regression.  As such, the reported t-statistics are 
computed from heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. In addition to this diagnostic, we 
also test whether our residuals are white noise after using corrected standard errors.  Statistics 
from our Q-test (Ljung-Box test) are insignificant at the 5% level at all lags which indicates that 
the residuals are white noise and that our model is an adequate fit to the repurchase program and 
cost of equity data (see Appendix for test statistics). 
4.1  Effect of Voluntary Compliance and the Cost of Equity 
Table 4.1 reports empirical results from the estimation of the model shown in equation (4.1). 
The cost of equity capital in excess of the risk free rate, RP, is the dependent variable in the four 
models presented in Table 4.1.  The main test variable in Model 1 is the Completion Rate, which 
is a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 100%.   
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Table 4.1  Effect of Voluntary Compliance on the Implied Cost of Equity 
 
DEPVAR  RP RP RP RP 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept (?) 0.044 0.043 0.045 0.046 
   (1.41) (1.35) (1.40) (1.51) 
Completion Rate (x10) (–) 0.104 0.030 0.071 0.115 
   (1.34) (0.27) (0.48) (1.30) 
Completion_High[Median] 
(x10) (?)  0.007   
   (0.99)   
Completion_High[Q3] (x10) (?)   0.003  
    (0.26)  
Completion_Dummy (x10) (?)    -0.002 
     (-0.26) 
Analyst Coverage (x100) (−) 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.006 
   (0.06) (0.01) (0.06) (0.08) 
Growth (x100) (+) 0.073** 0.074** 0.073** 0.072** 
   (2.34) (2.33) (2.32) (2.33) 
Volatility Analyst Coverage (+) 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 
   (0.58) (0.58) (0.58) (0.58) 
Market to Book (x100) (−) -0.902*** -0.908*** -0.899*** -0.895*** 
   (-3.41) (-3.41) (-3.41) (-3.31) 
Leverage (x1000) (+) -0.02 -0.015 -0.021 -0.021 
   (-0.2) (-0.15) (-0.21) (-0.21) 
Industry Cost of Equity (+) 0.342 0.345 0.337 0.335 
   (1.05) (1.05) (1.02) (1.04) 
Beta (+) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
   (-0.91) (-0.90) (-0.92) (-0.90) 
Adj R2  0.237 0.235 0.232 0.232 
N  154 154 154 154 
      
This table reports the regression results of the implied cost of equity on the repurchase program 
completion rate while controlling for various factors cited in the literature as having an impact on 
the cost of equity.  The dependent variable in all of these models RP, is computed as the 
aggregate cost of equity estimate in excess of the risk free rate (annualized Canadian 91-day T-
bill rate).   
Model 1: Completion Rate, the main explanatory variable of interest, is the rate of repurchase 
program fulfillment. This is defined as the number of shares a firm actually repurchases as a 
fraction of the total number of shares authorized for repurchase.   
Model 2: Completion_High[Median] is a dummy variable equal to one if the completion rate is 
greater than the median completion rate and equal to zero otherwise. 
Model 3: Completion_High[Q3] is a dummy variable equal to one if the completion rate is 
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greater than the third quartile completion rate and equal to zero otherwise. 
Model 4: Completion_Dummy is a dummy variable equal to one if the completion rate is greater 
than zero and equal to zero otherwise.   
Repurchase data is from Schmidt (2006).  For descriptions and sources of variables, see Table 
3.5.  The robust t-statistic is reported immediately below each estimate.  The superscript asterisks 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively (two-
tailed). 
 
In Model 1 of Table 4.1, the explanatory variables collectively explain 23.7% of the variation 
in the cost of equity of repurchasing firms. Focusing first on the main test variable, we observe 
that the coefficient of Completion Rate is positive but insignificant.  Thus, contrary to our 
prediction, there is no evidence to suggest that a firm’s higher voluntary repurchase compliance 
lowers perceptions of associated risk. We discuss the interpretation of this relationship later on in 
conjunction with results of robustness checks.  We next examine whether the inclusion of 
dummy variables used to indicate high completion and low completion categories provide any 
additional explanatory power. We report the results associated with these dummies in Models 2, 
3 and 4, which tell us the extent to which cost of equity for firms with higher completion rates 
deviates from that of firms with lower completion rates. Model 2 of Table 4.1 contains a dummy 
variable which takes the value of unity if the completion rate is higher than the median 
completion rate (which is 12% as shown in Table 3.4 Panel A).   In much the same manner, 
Model 3 contains a dummy variable which takes the value of unity if the completion rate is 
higher than the third quartile completion rate (which is 52% as shown in Table 3.4 Panel A).  
Model 4 contains a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the firm makes any degree of 
progress in its repurchase program (i.e. a non-zero completion rate).  None of the three dummy 
variables is statistically significant, suggesting that there are no completion rate levels or hurdles 
to pass before the cost of equity is affected. 
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 In addition to the completion rate variable in each of the models, we also include a 
number of firm-specific and industry factors (explained in detail in Section 3.3).  Coefficient 
signs and significance levels are consistent across all four models in Table 4.1.  Growth, Market 
to Book and Industry Cost of Equity exhibit the expected sign although only Growth and Market 
to Book are statistically significant.  Analyst Coverage, Leverage and Beta neither exhibit the 
expected sign nor are they significant.   
A positive and statistically significant impact of Growth on RP is consistent with the findings 
of Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001), Gode and Mohanram (2003), Dhaliwal, Krull, Li and 
Moser (2005), Dhaliwal, Heitzman and Li (2006).  The positive relation that we observe supports 
the argument of Gode and Mohanram (2003) that investors may be perceiving high long-term 
growth firms as riskier. The coefficient of the Volatility Analyst Coverage variable (a measure of 
the dispersion of analyst forecasts) is positive, as predicted, though not statistically significant.  
Dhaliwal, Heitzman and Li (2006) also find a positive relation between the implied cost of equity 
and the dispersion of analyst forecasts in their sample.  There is a negative and significant 
association (at the 1% level) between RP and Market to Book across all models.  This finding is 
consistent with Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001), who find that undervalued firms have 
high costs of equity.  Our result is also consistent with the findings of Gode and Mohanram 
(2003), Ashbaugh, Collins and LaFond (2004) and Dhaliwal, Krull, Li and Moser (2005). 
 The coefficient of the Leverage variable is directionally inconsistent with our prediction, 
though it is not statistically significant.  It is possible that the contradictory sign is a result of the 
significant correlation between Leverage and Completion Rate. A similar correlation issue arises 
between Analyst Coverage and Completion Rate.  These issues will be explored in the robustness 
section. The coefficient of Industry Cost of Equity is positive, as predicted, though not 
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statistically significant.  The positive sign is consistent with studies such as Gebhardt, Lee and 
Swaminathan (2001) and Dhaliwal, Krull, Li and Moser (2005).   
 To summarize our main findings, we find no evidence of a negative association between 
the firm’s cost of equity and its voluntary repurchase compliance. This suggests that share 
repurchase completion rates have little or no impact in reducing firms’ systematic risk and thus 
cost of equity capital. In the following section we perform a series of robustness tests to 
determine whether the findings are sensitive to the methodology used to generate the dependent 
variable, the choice of independent variables, and the choice of dependent variable specification. 
4.2  Robustness Checks 
In order to investigate the strength of our findings, we execute several robustness checks.  We 
determine whether each of the following considerations have an effect on our results: (1) the 
approach used to estimate the cost of equity; (2) the significant correlation between Completion 
Rate and Analyst Coverage (3); the significant correlation between Completion Rate and 
Leverage; and (4) the specification of the dependent variable. 
In Table 4.2, we study whether the relationship between cost of equity and the firm’s 
voluntary compliance as shown in Table 4.1 is robust to the approach used to estimate the cost of 
equity.  Rather than using RP (the aggregate cost of equity estimate in excess of the 91-day T-bill 
rate) as the dependent variable, we use estimates based on each of the individual models: the cost 
of equity in excess of the risk free rate estimated from the Claus and Thomas (2001) approach in 
Model 1, the Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001) approach in Model 2, the Ohlson and 
Juettner-Nauroth (2005) approach in Model 3, and the Easton (2004) approach in Model 4 
(subscripts in Table 4.2 denote the estimation approach followed).   
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Table 4.2  Effect of Voluntary Compliance on Individual Model RP 
      
DEPVAR  RPCT RPGLS RPOJ RPES 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept (?) 0.128* 0.051** 0.026 0.031 
   (1.67) (2.42) (1.04) (0.94) 
Completion Rate (x10) (−) 0.069 0.063 0.135 0.402* 
   (0.60) (0.92) (1.42) (1.87) 
Analyst Coverage (x100) (−) 0.078 -0.094 -0.110 0.195 
   (0.54) (-1.32) (-1.20) (1.04) 
Growth (x100) (+) 0.014 0.001 0.093*** 0.068** 
   (0.16) (0.09) (3.34) (2.32) 
Volatility Analyst 
Coverage (+) 0.095 -0.005** 0.031*** 0.031*** 
   (1.21) (-2.20) (5.84) (5.57) 
Market to Book (x100) (−) -0.753* -0.720*** -0.828** -0.592 
   (-1.68) (-3.16) (-2.50) (-1.55) 
Leverage (x1000) (+) -0.192 0.026 -0.165 -0.642** 
   (-0.83) (0.30) (-1.47) (-2.18) 
Industry Cost of Equity (+) -0.609 0.343 0.737*** 0.633** 
   (-0.73) (1.63) (3.09) (2.12) 
Beta (+) 0.017 -0.02*** -0.008 -0.017* 
   (0.55) (-4.24) (-1.33) (-1.90) 
Adj R2  0.142 0.102 0.358 0.165 
N  164 167 232 238 
      
This table reports the regression results of the implied cost of equity in excess of the risk free 
(91-day T-bill) rate on the repurchase program completion rate while controlling for various 
factors cited in the literature as having an impact on the cost of equity.  Dependent variables are 
the RP estimates computed from the implied cost of equity  estimates following the approaches 
of Claus and Thomas (2001), Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001), Ohlson and Juettner-
Nauroth (2005), and Easton (2004), respectively (discussed in Section 3.2), in excess of the risk 
free rate (annualized Canadian 91-day T-bill rate).  Completion Rate, the main explanatory 
variable of interest, is the rate of repurchase program fulfillment. This is defined as the number 
of shares a firm actually repurchases as a fraction of the total number of shares authorized for 
repurchase.  Repurchase data is from Schmidt (2006).  For descriptions and sources of variables, 
see Table 3.5.  The robust t-statistic is reported immediately below each estimate.  The 
superscript asterisks ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively (two-tailed). 
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The results of Table 4.2 confirm the findings of Table 4.1: completion rate does not affect the 
cost of equity, with the exception of model 4, where the ES cost of equity estimates are used. A 
stronger relation between RPES and Completion Rate as opposed to the relation between RPOJ 
and Completion rate can possibly be explained by differences in the assumptions of these 
models. As previously shown in Table 3.2, the ES model assumes abnormal earnings growth 
persists into perpetuity while the OJ model does not.  As such, a stronger relation between RPES 
and Completion Rate may result from these two variables picking up on a common trend. The 
positive (significant at 10%) completion rate coefficient in Model 4 (Table 4.2) is likely a 
spurious result. Dhaliwal, Heitzman and Li (2006, p. 699-700) support this argument and the use 
of an average estimate: “Limiting empirical analysis to just one measure may produce spurious 
results if particular attributes of the model are correlated with the variable of interest” and using 
the average of the four estimates following Hail and Leuz (2006) is a method of alleviating “the 
effect that particular assumptions of each model might have on […] results.” Though the ES and 
OJ cost of equity estimates are highly correlated, as reported in Table 3.3 Panel B, the differing 
regression results between the two models shown in Table 4.2 are possible because the data sets 
involved are different; the ES regression includes 238 observations, while the OJ regression 
includes 232 observations. The number of observations is different because of the data 
requirements of each cost of equity model (the OJ model implicitly requires that the two-year 
ahead earnings forecast exceeds the one-year ahead forecast, while the ES model involves no 
such requirement). As was discussed in Section 2.5 and shown in Table 3.2 of Section 3.2.4, the 
models capture different sets of information and it is not clear a priori that a particular model is 
more appropriate. 
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The main regressions (Table 4.1) use Analyst Coverage to measure information availability, 
which is proxied by size. However, size is significantly correlated (although the correlation is 
low) with Completion Rate (see Panel B of Table 3.4 for pairwise correlations). A strong and 
significant correlation between Completion Rate and Analyst Coverage may interfere with the 
interpretation of the impact of Completion Rate on the cost of equity.  To address this concern, 
we used an alternative popular proxy of size, Log Assets, which also turned out to be 
significantly correlated with the main explanatory variable.  Nonetheless, in the current 
robustness check, we address the information availability issue by including each size proxy 
individually (Table 4.3, Models 1 and 2) and omitting the size proxy altogether (Table 4.3, 
Model 3) to see whether the magnitude and significance of the Completion Rate variable 
changes. We find that the magnitude of the coefficient of Completion Rate is consistent across 
the three models (0.104, 0.096, and 0.105) and the level of significance is also consistent 
(insignificant across all three models).  From these results, we conclude that the choice of size 
proxy does not have a significant impact on our results, and also that the results are not sensitive 
to the correlation between the size proxy and the main explanatory variable. This may be because 
although the correlations are significant, they are low (in the range of 0.3). 
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Table 4.3  Robustness Check for Size Proxy 
DEPVAR  RP RP RP 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept (?) 0.044 0.040 0.044 
   (1.41) (1.22) (1.43) 
Completion Rate (x10) (−) 0.104 0.096 0.105 
   (1.34) (1.22) (1.40) 
Analyst Coverage 
(x100) (−) 0.004   
   (0.06)   
Log Assets (x10) (−)  0.008  
   (0.60)  
Growth (x100) (+) 0.073** 0.075** 0.073** 
   (2.34) (2.34) (2.33) 
Volatility Analyst 
Coverage (+) 0.015 0.015 0.015 
   (0.58) (0.61) (0.59) 
Market to Book (x100) (−) -0.902*** -0.904*** -0.900*** 
   (-3.41) (-3.36) (-3.37) 
Leverage (x1000) (+) -0.02 -0.054 -0.02 
   (-0.20) (-0.50) (-0.20) 
Industry Cost of Equity (+) 0.342 0.333 0.345 
   (1.05) (1.09) (1.13) 
Beta (+) -0.01 -0.009 -0.01 
   (-0.91) (-0.85) (-0.87) 
Adj R2  0.237 0.238 0.242 
N  154 154 154 
     
This table reports the results of the regression of RP (computed as the aggregate implied cost of 
equity estimate in excess of the risk free rate) on the repurchase program completion rate while 
controlling for various factors cited in the literature as having an impact on the cost of equity. 
This table enables comparison of the magnitude and significance level of the coefficient of 
Completion Rate in regressions using Analyst Coverage as a proxy for size (Model 1), Log 
Assets as a proxy for size (Model 2) and with the size proxy omitted (Model 3).  The dependent 
variable in the three models is RP, defined as the aggregate cost of equity estimate in excess of 
the risk free rate (annualized Canadian 91-day T-bill rate).  Completion Rate, the main 
explanatory variable of interest, is the rate of repurchase program fulfillment. This is defined as 
the number of shares a firm actually repurchases as a fraction of the total number of shares 
authorized for repurchase.  Repurchase data is from Schmidt (2006).  For descriptions and 
sources of variables, see Table 3.5.  The robust t-statistic is reported immediately below each 
estimate.  The superscript asterisks ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Completion Rate and Leverage are also weakly correlated (0.22).  Similar to the above 
robustness check, we determine whether the magnitude and significance level of the coefficient 
of Completion Rate changes in regressions including Leverage (Table 4.4 Model 1) and omitting 
Leverage (Table 4.4 Model 2).   
Table 4.4  Robustness Check for Possible Collinearity Problems with Leverage 
DEPVAR  RP RP 
Variable Expected Sign Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept (?) 0.044 0.043 
   (1.41) (1.50) 
Completion Rate (x10) (−) 0.104 0.101 
   (1.34) (1.33) 
Analyst Coverage 
(x100) (−) 0.004 0.002 
   (0.06) (0.03) 
Growth (x100) (+) 0.073** 0.074** 
   (2.34) (2.44) 
Volatility Analyst 
Coverage (+) 0.015 0.015 
   (0.58) (0.58) 
Market to Book (x100) (−) -0.902*** -0.903*** 
   (-3.41) (-3.44) 
Leverage (x1000) (+) -0.020  
   (-0.20)  
Industry Cost of Equity (+) 0.342 0.347 
   (1.05) (1.11) 
Beta (+) -0.01 -0.01 
   (-0.91) (-0.97) 
Adj R2  0.237 0.242 
N  154 154 
    
This table reports regression results of RP (the aggregate implied cost of equity estimate in 
excess of the risk free rate) on the completion rate while controlling for various factors cited in 
the literature as having an impact on the cost of equity. This table enables comparison of the 
magnitude and significance level of the coefficient of Completion Rate in regressions including 
Leverage (Model 1) and omitting Leverage (Model 2). The dependent variable in both models is 
RP, defined as the aggregate cost of equity estimate in excess of the risk free rate (annualized 
Canadian 91-day T-bill rate). Completion Rate, the main explanatory variable of interest, is the 
rate of repurchase program fulfillment, defined as the number of shares a firm actually 
repurchases as a fraction of the total number of shares authorized for repurchase.  Repurchase 
data is from Schmidt (2006).  For descriptions and sources of variables, see Table 3.5. The 
robust t-statistic is reported immediately below each estimate. Superscript asterisks ***, ** and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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We observe that the magnitude of the Completion Rate coefficient (0.104 and 0.101) and the 
significance level (insignificant in both models) remains the same.  We therefore conclude that 
the correlation between the two variables does not affect our results.   
 In Table 4.1, our dependent variable is RP -- the cost of equity in excess of risk free rate.  
We investigate the robustness of the results of Table 4.1 with modified specifications of the 
aggregate cost of equity. The current objective is to examine the results for different 
specifications of the aggregate cost of equity estimate as the dependent variable. In Table 4.5, we 
use the raw aggregate cost of equity estimate, K, as the dependent variable instead of RP. Most 
notably, we again do not find a negative relationship between the alternative cost of equity 
specification and the main test variable, Completion Rate.  Also similar to the results of Table 




Table 4.5  Effect of Voluntary Compliance on the Implied Cost of Equity Capital 
 
DEPVAR  K K K K 
Variable 
Expecte
d Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept (?) 0.068** 0.066** 0.069** 0.064** 
   (2.39) (2.27) (2.36) (2.32) 
Completion Rate (x10) (−) 0.138* 0.040 0.086 0.109 
   (1.97) (0.40) (0.56) (1.40) 
Completion_High[Median] 
(x10) (?)  0.009   
   (1.43)   
Completion_High[Q3] (x10) (?)   0.005  
    (0.37)  
Completion_Dummy (x10) (?)    0.004 
     (0.76) 
Analyst Coverage (x100) (−) -0.025 -0.03 -0.025 -0.029 
   (-0.39) (-0.45) (-0.39) (-0.45) 
Growth (x100) (+) 0.070** 0.071** 0.070** 0.072** 
   (2.28) (2.27) (2.26) (2.36) 
Volatility Analyst Coverage (+) 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 
   (0.85) (0.85) (0.85) (0.85) 
Market to Book (x100) (−) -0.772*** -0.780*** -0.768*** -0.788*** 
   (-2.84) (-2.84) (-2.86) (-2.83) 
Leverage (x1000) (+) -0.028 -0.021 -0.029 -0.025 
   (-0.31) (-0.23) (-0.32) (-0.28) 
Industry Cost of Equity (+) 0.379 0.383 0.371 0.399 
   (1.28) (1.27) (1.23) (1.37) 
Beta (+) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
   (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) 
Adj R2  0.292 0.294 0.288 0.289 
N  154 154 154 154 
      
This table reports the results of the regression of implied cost of equity on repurchase program 
completion rates while controlling for various factors cited in the literature as having an impact 
on the cost of equity.  The dependent variable in all of these models is the aggregate estimate, 
taken as the average across the four cost of equity models for observations where all four 
estimates are obtainable.     
Model 1: Completion Rate, the main explanatory variable of interest, is the rate of repurchase 
program fulfillment. This is defined as the number of shares a firm actually repurchases as a 
fraction of the total number of shares authorized for repurchase.   
Model 2: Completion_High[Median] is a dummy variable equal to one if the completion rate is 
greater than the median completion rate and equal to zero otherwise. 
Model 3: Completion_High[Q3] is a dummy variable equal to one if the completion rate is 
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greater than the third quartile completion rate and equal to zero otherwise. 
Model 4: Completion_Dummy is a dummy variable equal to one if the completion rate is greater 
than zero and equal to zero otherwise.   
Repurchase data is from Schmidt (2006).  For descriptions and sources of variables, see Table 
3.5.  The robust t-statistic is reported immediately below each estimate.  The superscript 
asterisks ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
 
4.3  Discussion 
Summarizing our findings, we find no evidence of a negative relationship between cost of 
equity and the repurchase program completion rate.  The main results presented in Table 4.1, in 
conjunction with results from robustness tests presented in Tables 8 and 9 lead to several 
possible explanations:   
(i) Investors and firms do not consider repurchase activity as a form of compliance.   
(ii) Repurchase compliance is important to the firm but investors find this information 
irrelevant in determining the cost of equity. 
(iii) The repurchase completion rate is a form of voluntary compliance and lowers the cost of 
capital. However, the effect is offset by decreased liquidity stemming from the 
presence of the firm in the market for its shares. 
Our empirical results do not support a negative relationship between the firm’s share 
repurchase completion rate and its cost of equity.  This may reflect a weak link between the 
completion rate and voluntary compliance. More specifically, the completion rate may not be a 
perfect measure of voluntary compliance, and one may exercise caution in interpreting these 
results as the size of repurchase programs may be too small for the market to take notice in 
assessing the credibility of firm management. The Toronto Stock Exchange allows firms to 
repurchase up to the greater of 5% of shares outstanding or 10% of the public float (see Footnote 
8 in Section 2.1.2). Potential alternative measures of voluntary compliance might include any 
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instance where the firm announces some action and the degree of follow-through is clearly 
measurable. For instance, Chapple, Cooke, Galt and Paton (2001) investigate attributes of firms 
in the U.K. which voluntarily comply with international environmental management standards. 
Consider also Dumontier and Raffournier (1998) who discuss the characteristics of firms in 
Switzerland (with their low national accounting regulation) that voluntarily comply with the 
comparatively more stringent International Accounting Standards. 
The lack of relationship between the repurchase program completion rate and the firm’s cost 
of equity is perhaps consistent with alternative theories for the determinants of completion rates. 
A number of studies suggest that the underlying rationale for a firm’s repurchase activity can be 
attributed to undervaluation theories. For instance, Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (2000) 
examine Canadian share repurchase programs and suggest that the firm’s repurchase activity is 
the result of managers’ sensitivity to price movements. They contend that when prices rise, 
issues related to undervaluation are alleviated and there is less incentive for firms to repurchase.  
A drop in prices increases the incentives of repurchasing to address issues related to 
undervaluation and share mispricing and leads to a higher number of shares repurchased. They 
also find that value stocks have higher completion rates in general compared to growth stocks, 
which is also consistent with the undervaluation motive for repurchases. Focusing on French 
firms, Ginglinger and Hamon (2007) similarly conclude that firms repurchase for reasons of 
price support. They observe that firms repurchase contrary to market trends. If undervaluation is 
the impetus behind share repurchases then it would explain why we observe no evidence of a 
relationship between the firm’s completion rate and the cost of equity; managers are not trying to 
signal their commitment or reliability and the market regards the completion rate as a signal of 
undervaluation and not of voluntary compliance. 
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A second possible explanation for our results is that the cost of capital is not a channel 
through which the voluntary compliance affects firm value. Several studies document a positive 
price reaction immediately surrounding the repurchase program announcement [eg. Grullon and 
Michaely (2002b); Chan, Ikenberry and Lee (2004); Ikenberry, Lakonishok and 
Vermaelen(2000)] and also post-announcement [eg Ikenberry, Lakonishok and 
Vermaelen(2000); Chan, Ikenberry and Lee (2004)]. Mishra, Racine and Schmidt (2007) 
document a relationship between the firm’s completion credibility and the price reaction to 
subsequent repurchase program announcements. According to the classic discounted cash flow 
equation, a firm’s value is a function of its expected cash flows (the numerator) and the cost of 
equity (the denominator). Since our models allow us to estimate cost of equity while 
simultaneously controlling for expected cash flows, our results suggest that cost of equity is not a 
channel through which voluntary compliance measured by share repurchase completion affects 
firm value.  
 A third possible explanation for our results is that the repurchase completion rate is a form of 
voluntary compliance and indeed lowers cost of equity, however, the effect is offset by decreased 
liquidity. Empirical evidence, [Barclay and Smith (1988)] suggests that open-market repurchases 
lead to a decrease in liquidity because of the firm’s presence in the secondary market for its 
shares.  For example, consider the presence of the firm (an informed insider) in the market, the 
market-maker (an uninformed outsider) anticipates losses to this more-informed trader (firm) and 
seeks to recover these losses by widening the bid-ask spread, thus lowering liquidity. Barclay 
and Smith (1988) find evidence in support of this theory for U.S. open-market share repurchases 
announced between 1970 and 1978. More recently, Brockman and Chung (2001) also report 
wider bid-ask spreads during repurchase periods for stocks on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.  
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Wider bid-ask spreads imply increased information asymmetry, and increased (decreased) 
information asymmetry factors into a higher (lower) cost of capital [Easley and O’Hara (2004); 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1991)]. Therefore, the increase in the cost of capital due to the 
perceived increase in information asymmetry between the informed trader (firm) and uninformed 
trader (market maker) may be large enough to offset any reduction in cost of capital associated 
with voluntary compliance imbedded in share repurchases completion. A test for this argument is 
beyond the scope of this thesis and thus left for future research. 
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CHAPTER 5     
CONCLUSION 
 We use a sample of Canadian repurchase events to examine the effect of voluntary 
compliance (measured by the share repurchase completion rate) on the firm’s cost of equity 
capital. 
The regulatory environment governing repurchases in Canada allows firms a great deal of 
flexibility concerning their repurchase completion. As such, we anticipated that open-market 
share repurchases would be an informative measure of voluntary compliance. Theoretical 
research discusses the effect of voluntary information disclosure on the cost of equity capital 
with particular emphasis on the role of disclosure in reducing information asymmetries between 
the firm and its investors.  Despite our prediction that a firm might be able to lower its cost of 
equity by signaling its reliability through increased voluntary repurchase compliance, we find no 
evidence to support this notion.  Evidence shows that even if the firm leaves its repurchase 
program incomplete, market perceptions of firm risk remain unaffected.   
One possible explanation for our findings is that the firm’s repurchase activity and hence its 
degree of program completion may be dependent on various situational factors such as 
managers’ sensitivity to price movements which make repurchasing in some instances more 
advantageous. These factors may have little bearing on firm risk and are not indicative of 
managerial reliability.  From the perspective of the firm and also of the investors, the degree of 
program completion is therefore not considered a form of compliance. The second possible 
explanation for our results is that the repurchase program completion rate may indeed be 
positively interpreted by the market as a measure of the firm’s credible fulfillment of its 
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corporate promises, however, the cost of equity is not the channel through which this credibility 
is factored into firm value. The third possibility is that the firm’s repurchase completion rate is a 
form of voluntary compliance and lowers the cost of equity, but this effect is offset by decreased 
liquidity effects resulting from the presence of the firm (as a more-informed trader) in the 
market.   
We do not explicitly test these explanations in the current study, but leave them as avenues for 
future research.  For instance, future research might include explicitly investigating the impact of 
the repurchase program completion rate on the firm’s liquidity. 
5.1  Limitations 
Potential limitations of the current study fall into categories of data availability, timing of 
measurement, and potential biases in the data sources. First, in order to estimate the cost of 
equity following the four models and to run the regression of cost of equity on completion rate 
and control variables, data was obtained from IBES and Compustat. Analyst coverage is likely to 
be better for larger firms; hence, it is possible that smaller firms that normally receive less 
analyst coverage are excluded from the final sample. Because of this, the IBES database might 
offer limited data on these firms, and they are naturally excluded when constructing our sample. 
The issue of survivorship bias in Compustat data is discussed by Falkenstein (2000) who 
suggests that small firms with irregular financial reporting or that exist for only one or two years 
and become bankrupt will generally not be included in Compustat. Therefore our data set 
excludes such small firms. 
The impact of a large firm bias could be an important point to consider when interpreting the 
results of this study. It is possible that the finding of no relationship between cost of equity and 
voluntary repurchase compliance does not apply to smaller firms. Thus we must proceed with 
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caution in extrapolating the current conclusions to an expanded set of firms with sizes outside the 
range used in this study; of course, this type of caveat is valid for any research.  
A second potential limitation relates to the gap in time between when the firm makes its 
repurchases and when the cost of equity is measured in the 13th month. This might be an issue 
for instances in which firms make all of their repurchases prior to the termination month of the 
repurchase program. In cases such as these, the cost of equity is less likely to fully capture the 
effect of the firm’s voluntary compliance. And the earlier the firm completes its repurchases the 
higher the chance that the cost of equity in the 13th month is capturing the effect of some other 
event in the intervening months. The existence of this time gap could present a possible reason 
behind this study’s findings if conflicting events are diluting the predicted effect. It would be 
ideal if daily repurchase data could be obtained so that the completion rate could also be 
computed daily. The cost of equity could then be immediately estimated at the completion date 
of the repurchase program. In the current study we use the completion rate available in the 12th 
month due to data availability. Future research may consider estimating cost of equity closer to 
the actual termination of the repurchase program. 
Third, the I/B/E/S database reports sell-side analyst forecasts which tend to be more 
optimistic [Conroy and Harris (1995); Dugar and Nathan (1995)]. This may lead to an upward 
bias in cost of equity estimates [Easton and Sommers (2006)]. If forecasts are consistently 
optimistic across our sample, that is, the increment in the earnings forecast is uniform across all 
firms, then adjustments can be made accordingly. These modifications are difficult to make if the 
optimism is unevenly applied. Therefore a potential limitation of the current study is in implicitly 
assuming that if a forecast bias exists in the sample, it is a uniform bias that results in increases 
in earnings forecasts that are consistent across all firms included in IBES. 
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5.2  Contributions 
Prior research finds that repurchase program completion rates are associated with a positive 
market reaction [Mishra, Racine and Schmidt (2007)]. The current study contributes by 
examining whether the cost of equity is a channel through which share repurchases affect post-
completion firm value. Our findings suggest the cost of equity is not a significant channel 
through which the completion rate affects firm value.  However, our results have implications for 
practitioners. For example, repurchasing firm managers may not need to adjust their cost of 
equity to reflect the degree of completion.  
This study makes two other contributions. First, we explore the information conveyed through 
the repurchase program completion rate, which researchers have only recently begun to focus on 
[e.g., Stephens and Weisbach (1998); Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (2000); Chan, 
Ikenberry, Lee and Wang (2005)]. The current study contributes to this line of research by 
examining the repurchase completion rate as a measure of the firm’s voluntary compliance and 
examining whether it has an impact on the firm’s cost of equity. To this author’s knowledge, the 
relationship between repurchase program completion rate and the firm’s implied cost of equity 
has not been previously directly examined.  
A second contribution made by this study is in applying recently developed approaches to 
estimate the cost of equity. The implied cost of equity estimation approach allows a direct test of 
the perceived impact of share repurchases in the firm’s cost of capital (denominator term of the 
discounted cash flow equation), while simultaneously controlling for its impact in expected cash 
flows (numerator term).  
5.3  Suggestions for Future Research 
The current study makes progress in addressing the question of whether the repurchasing 
firm’s cost of equity is affected by its voluntary compliance. There are indeed many possible 
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avenues for future research. If monthly repurchase data was gathered, it would be interesting to 
see whether firms that made all of their repurchases immediately, for instance in the first month 
or first few months, experienced an impact in their cost of equity that was different from firms 
that took their time and made their share repurchases in stages over the span of the 12-month 
period. It is possible that investors perceive firms that immediately complete their programs as 
more committed than firms that choose to wait. Future research might also focus on identifying 
the actual date of repurchase program completion and estimating the cost of equity at a point 
subsequent to that date. 
Another suggestion for future research would be to examine the cost of equity impact of the 
voluntary compliance of firms that are frequent repurchasers versus firms that repurchase 
infrequently. Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) suggest that firms which repurchase infrequently 
may be characterized as having higher degrees of information asymmetry. It would be interesting 
to see whether the degree of voluntary repurchase compliance has a larger impact on the cost of 
equity for these firms.   
A third prospective avenue for research is in examining the firm’s voluntary repurchase 
compliance and the impact on the cost of equity in conjunction with the reason behind the 
repurchase. Rules of the Toronto Stock Exchange pertaining to open-market share repurchase 
programs specify that the repurchasing firm must issue a press release which includes the reason 
for repurchasing. It might be interesting to categorize observations based on the reason for 
repurchase and examine whether the level of the firm’s voluntary compliance is different among 
these categories and also to determine whether the impact on the cost of equity is different 
among these categories.   
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APPENDIX OF DIAGNOSTICS 
 
White’s Test (test for heteroskedasticity) 
 
DF ChiSq Probability 




Q-test (test whether residuals are white noise) 
 
Summary Statistics of Residuals 
Mean  1.64E-17   
Standard Deviation 0.0271   
Number of Observations 154   
Autocorrelation Check for White Noise 
ToLags ChiSq DF ProbChiSq Autocorrelations  
6 10.621 6 0.101 0.129 0.118 0.135 0.100 0.060 0.066 
12 15.976 12 0.192 -0.040 -0.031 -0.117 -0.075 -0.095 -0.036 
18 27.874 18 0.064 -0.023 -0.112 0.112 0.139 -0.065 0.138 
24 35.286 24 0.064 0.103 0.012 0.145 -0.050 0.045 -0.068 
 
 
 
 
